A NEW ORDER IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:
POLISH-SOVET NEGOTIATIONS
AND THE PEACE OF RIGA (1920–1921)

Abstract

The aim of this article is to discuss the current state of research and published sources on the Polish-Soviet negotiations and treaty that put an end to the armed conflict of 1918/1919–1920. It emphasises the significance of the peace treaty signed on 18 March 1921 in Riga for the resetting of relations between countries in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War. The text puts forward a thesis – widely accepted in Polish historiography but basically overlooked by Western and Russian historians – that the Treaty of Riga constituted the completion and fulfilment of the European order, the most important element of which was the Treaty of Versailles and subsequent peace treaties; therefore, the term ‘Versailles-Riga Order’ is used. It outlines the attitudes of European superpowers and those of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the representatives of the Russian White Movement towards the issues raised during the negotiations in Riga, especially with regards to the shape of the border between the Republic of Poland and Soviet Russia. The article also discusses the objectives, diplomatic tactics and composition of the Polish and Soviet delegations. It points out that the negotiations in Riga were sort of a testing ground for both the Polish and Soviet parties. Moreover, the most important provisions of the peace treaty are discussed from a broad perspective, as well as the methods of their implementation in the following years, namely the issue of establishing the Polish-Soviet border, financial settlements and liabilities, reclaiming cultural heritage, and – last but not least – the repatriation of populations to Poland, Russia and Soviet Ukraine.

Keywords: Treaty of Riga; Treaty of Versailles; Polish-Sovet War; Soviet Russia; Central and Eastern Europe; international relations; diplomacy
A fair number of academic studies have already been written on the Polish-Soviet negotiations aimed at ending the armed conflict that had been declared by neither side and lasted from the turn of 1919 until autumn 1920, as well as on the peace treaty signed in Riga on 18 March 1921. We also have several important source editions related to the topic at our disposal. Some of the earliest publications were made by the Soviet side almost immediately after the Peace Conference in Riga, although these were far from complete. In Warsaw, on the other hand, a number of documents related to the work of the mixed Polish-Soviet committees that implemented the provisions of the peace treaty were published. Ten years after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Riga, the chairman of the Polish delegation, Jan Dąbski, published his valuable memoirs supplemented by an edition of several documents on the negotiations with the Soviets. Despite being subjective, they remain an important source of information about the events that are of interest to us. After the Second World War, and more precisely after the end of the Stalinist period, some important documents concerning the terms of peace and the development of peaceful relations after the Polish-Soviet War were published, with an emphasis on diplomatic sources. However, due to censorship, which was a characteristic phenomenon in both the Soviet Union and the Polish People’s Republic, the selection of documents aimed to demonstrate that the endeavours of Soviet diplomacy were peace-oriented, as opposed to the supposedly aggressive plans of the Poles. This does not mean that such documents, for example those in the monumental series Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR and the following Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków polsko-radzieckich, are worthless. On the contrary, we use them to this day, yet with the awareness that there is an ideological stigma attached to them, and that they should be confronted with other sources. Many valuable documents have also been published in collect-

1 Советская Россия и Польша. Сборник документов, изданных Народным Комиссариатом РСФСР по Иностранным Делям, Москва 1921 [Sovetskaya Rossiya i Pol’sha. Sbornik dokumentov, izdannikh Narodnym Komissariatom RSFSR po Inostrannym Delam, Moskva 1921]; Советская Украина и Польша. Сборник дипломатических документов и исторических материалов, Харьков 1921 [Sovetskaya Ukraina i Pol’sha. Sbornik diplomaticheskikh dokumentov i istoricheskikh materialov, Khar’kov 1921].

2 Dokumenty dotyczące akcji Delegacyj Polskich w Komisjach Mieszanych Reewakuacyjnej i Specjalnej, z. 1–9, Warszawa 1922–1924.

3 Jan Dąbski, Pokój ryski. Wspomnienia, pertraktacje, tajne układy z Joffem, listy, Warszawa 1931.

4 Документы внешней политики СССР, т. 3: 1 июля 1920 г. – 18 марта 1921 г., ред. Геннадий А. Белов [et al.], Москва 1959 [Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR, t. 3: 1 iyulya 1920 g. – 18 marta 1921 g., red. Gennadiy A. Belov [et al.], Moskva 1959].

tions on Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Belarusian relations, as well as in scholarly journals. Furthermore, in recent years two book series have been published which include some documents on the peace negotiations and the Treaty of Riga, along with the sources that had been previously unknown and remained outside the mainstream of scholarship. The first of the series was prepared by Russian researchers, whereas the second by Polish scholars.

The books by the Soviet historian Prokhor N. Ol’shanskiy, filled with ideological communist propaganda, are a testimony to the times in which they were written. On the other hand, Polish émigré historians wrote about the Treaty of Riga in a much more objective manner, although they did not have access to key documents. An important work on the Polish-Soviet peace treaty, of both synthetic and analytical nature, was a book by Jerzy Kumaniecki published under censorship in 1985; many of his findings remain valid to this day. It was not until the democratic changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union that historians were able to conduct research in post-Soviet archives, some of which were partially opened, and to write without interference from the censors about the complexities of Polish-Soviet relations, including the Treaty of Riga and its significance for the reordering of Europe after 1918. In March 1996, a scientific conference took place at the Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń to mark the 75th anniversary of the signing of the Peace Treaty of Riga. Participants included Polish historians and representatives of Russian and German historiography. Selected aspects related to the origins of the Treaty of Riga, as well as its later assessment, implementation and aftermath, were discussed from various perspectives, also

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from Ukrainian and Belarusian standpoints\textsuperscript{11}. The subject, however, was still far from exhausted. The recent years have seen historians increasingly interested in the circumstances in which the Treaty of Riga was concluded and in its results. It has become the subject of research by Polish and Russian authors writing on relations between Warsaw and Moscow in the interwar period\textsuperscript{12}. In 2008 the Polish-Canadian historian Jerzy Borzęcki, employed at the University of Toronto, published a detailed monograph devoted to both the peace negotiations and the far-reaching implications of the Treaty of Riga. It was prepared on the basis of vast number of primary sources, including archival Soviet documents. The author described not only many detailed issues, but also stressed the importance of the Treaty of Riga for the formation of interwar Eastern Europe\textsuperscript{13}. So far, Borzęcki’s monograph has been the most complete and best-known study of the peace signed in Riga. In June 2011, an international scientific conference that included Polish, Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Latvian participants was held in Riga, in the renovated House of the Blackheads, the symbolic site where the treaty had been signed more than 90 years prior. It was organised by the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (Centrum Polsko-Rosyjskiego Dialogu i Porozumienia) in Warsaw, with the support of the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Issues (Polsko-Rosyjska Grupa do Spraw Trudnych). As a result, a sizeable book was published, which contains over a dozen chapters devoted to various interpretations and controversies surrounding the Treaty of Riga, with an emphasis on the topic’s perception in national historiographies\textsuperscript{14}. It is also worth noting the interest that contemporary Belarusian historiography takes in the Polish-Soviet peace of 1921, mainly in terms of its impact on the fate of Belarusians, whose population became split between the Republic of Poland and Soviet Russia, later the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{15}.

\textsuperscript{11} Traktat ryski 1921 roku po 75 latach, red. Mieczysław Wojciechowski, Toruń 1998.


Some Polish historians, including the author of this article, take the view that the Treaty of Riga complemented the order established in 1919 during the Paris Peace Conference. In principle, the Treaty of Versailles did not regulate matters related to Central and Eastern Europe. This was primarily due to the still unresolved civil war in Russia between the Whites and Bolsheviks. The leaders of the Entente Powers hoped for a victory of the Whites and their return to the negotiations as the representatives of the Russian Empire which had been a member of the Triple Entente. Territorial conflicts between the newly formed states of Central and Eastern Europe also played a significant role in the way in which the situation of the region was (not) internationally ordered at the time. However, the Polish-Soviet War was not a purely territorial conflict whose aim was to establish a favourable border for each warring side. As weeks and months passed, it became more of a conflict of a political-ideological nature, the essence of which was the expansion of communism in its Bolshevik guise on the one hand, and its suppression on the other. In the eyes of Vladimir Lenin and other communist ideologues, the conflict was intended precisely to shatter the newly established Versailles Order. The leader of the Bolsheviks made this clear in a speech at a convention of workers and labourers of the tanning industry on 2 October 1920: ‘[…] by defeating Yudenich, Kolchak and Denikin, we could not shred the Peace of Versailles […] while by invading Poland, we invade the Triple Entente itself; by smashing the Polish army, we smash that Peace of Versailles on which the whole system of present international relations is based.

If Poland became a Soviet republic, if the labourers of Warsaw received aid from Soviet Russia […] , the Peace of Versailles would be shattered and the whole international system, established on the victory over Germany, would collapse. France would then have no buffer separating Germany from Soviet Russia.

Not every politician from Western Europe or the United States seemed to understand this, and thus to grasp the significance of the Polish-Soviet war.
Perhaps only in France was this fact understood, and France was the country that aided Poland the most among all the countries of Western Europe\(^9\). This does not mean, however, that the French emphasised the importance of the peace treaty concluded in Riga. The daily newspaper *Le Temps*, affiliated with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whose coverage was dominated by international affairs, reported the signing of the Polish-Soviet peace treaty only on the second page with a short note and a list of its most important provisions\(^{20}\). The same newspaper devoted much more space to the events that were taking place almost simultaneously in Eastern Europe: the sailors’ rebellion against Soviet governance in Kronstadt and the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, which was to decide on whether this territory belonged to Poland or Germany. Instead, the threat posed by the Bolshevik rule was better understood by the leaders of Central and Eastern European countries that had experienced the attempts to have a communist system imposed. This was particularly true of Hungary, Romania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. The Germans, on the other hand, viewed the Polish-Soviet conflict, especially during its breakthrough events in the summer of 1920, as an opportunity to revise the Treaty of Versailles, which was restraining them\(^{21}\). These fears of communist expansion or hopes of overthrowing the order established at the Paris Peace Conference receded for almost 20 years. It was precisely for these reasons that the Treaty of Riga complemented the Versailles Order for Central and Eastern Europe and ensured its stability for almost two decades: not only for the states that signed the Treaty of Riga, i.e. Poland, Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine, but also for Romania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland. The treaty’s violation by the Soviet Union in September 1939 meant either the loss of independence for most of these countries (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), or the imminent loss of parts of territory (Finland and Romania). The order established in Riga collapsed along with the order established in Versailles, although the latter was dismantled gradually and accelerated only in the late 1930s. This leads to the conclusion that we can speak of the Versailles-Riga Order shaped


\(^{20}\) *Nouvelles de l’étranger. La signature de la paix de Riga*, Le Temps, 21 III 1921, no. 21780, p. 2; *Pologne. La paix de Riga*, Le Temps, 22 III 1921, no. 21781, p. 2.

in the years 1919–1921 that existed until 1939, possibly only in its residual form until 1940.

Neither Western nor Russian historiography incorporated the term ‘Versailles-Riga Order’. In the former case, this is probably due to an underestimation of the events that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, which for American or Western European researchers appeared as a distant land and area of research at best. One can draw an analogy, which is perhaps not entirely legitimate but surely symbolic, with the underestimation of the significance of the Eastern Front for the fate of the First World War, although contemporary Russian historiography, in the context of the centenary celebrations of that conflict, has done much to change this perception. As far as Russian historiography is concerned, the author’s attempt to introduce the term ‘Versailles-Riga Order’ was described by the editor of the volume that included my article as ‘debatable and forcing a new interpretation of the nature and essence of the peace order created after the end of the Great War’. Most Russian historians believe that the Polish-Soviet War, and thus the peace that ended it, was but a regional event, one out of many similar events, not important enough to be regarded as complementary to the Versailles Order for Central and Eastern Europe. Perhaps this is due to a fear of departing from the dominant narrative from the Soviet period, according to which the Bolshevik state bore no responsibility for the peace established after the First World War, as it did not participate in its development in any way. I do not share this view.

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The negotiations in Riga were a testing ground for both Polish and Soviet diplomats. In both cases, their diplomatic corps had been established for only

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a few years, almost from scratch. They lacked experience, professional personnel, or even a proper technical infrastructure. The Polish side was negotiating the terms of peace with a new type of state, one with a vertical power structure, with Lenin at the top. In practice, it was Lenin to whom all institutions that shaped Soviet policy were subordinated, especially the structures of the Bolshevik Party. Occasionally, it was Lenin who personally formulated directives on the negotiations with the Poles. Most often, however, this was done by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia, Georgy Chicherin, who consulted them with members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). At that time, the Bolsheviks could not be bothered by public opinion in the countries they ruled, which were represented in Riga by the delegations of Soviet Russia and Ukraine. Political, military and economic interests were not the only guidelines for Soviet negotiators. Equally important was the promotion of communism in Europe, i.e. an ideology with a long-term outlook, calculated for a distant future, and aimed not only at the Polish partner, but much further and much wider; this is corroborated by the aforementioned quote from Lenin. Meanwhile, Poland was a democratic state in which political parties, through their representatives in the Legislative Sejm elected in 1919, had a considerable influence on the shape of foreign policy, including relations with Soviet Russia and Soviet Ukraine. Another centre that shaped foreign policy was the Chief of State Józef Piłsudski and his entourage. Yet another was the Cabinet of Ministers, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ministries responsible for the economy playing the leading role. As a result, the Polish delegation in Riga was not unanimous in its views; it was pluralistic, which in turn sometimes led to misunderstandings, perhaps not so much with regard to outlining strategic goals as to the tactics for achieving them. In their talks with the Soviet side, the Poles were guided by the Latin maxim *pacta sunt servanda* (‘agreements must be kept’). It was rather justified that the chairman of the Soviet delegation, Adolf Joffe, pointed to the Poles’ ‘uncertainty and lack of initiative’ as early as in September 1920. The Soviet delegation acted ruthlessly and cynically at times, but in many cases such attitude was very effective.

It is true that both sides lacked diplomatic experience. This factor, however, was more evident on the Polish side. Adolf Joffe had already worked as a member and consultant of the Soviet delegation in Brest during negotiations with the representatives of the Central Powers in 1917–1918; he was also the Soviet diplomatic representative in Germany and led delegations during talks

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aimed at concluding peace with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The chairman of the Polish delegation, Deputy Foreign Minister Jan Dąbksi, could not boast of such experience. This was particularly evident during one-on-one talks between the two chairmen, or with the participation of the secretaries: Aleksander Ładoś on the Polish side, and Ivan Lorenc on the Soviet side. Several key decisions were made during those meetings, which were reflected in the articles of the peace treaty. In the Polish delegation, an important, perhaps even essential role was played by Professor Stanislaw Grabski, a prominent leader of National Democracy able to impose his point of view on other Polish representatives. The events taking place in Riga were keenly observed by military experts on the Polish side, in particular Lieutenant Colonel Ignacy Matuszewski, head of the Second Department (responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence) of the Polish Army High Command. He was able to organise an efficient system for obtaining information through the interception and decryption of correspondence between the Soviet delegation and Moscow. These were passed on to Warsaw on a regular basis. I am not sure, however, whether the Polish side was able to make effective use of this information. On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the post of chief expert was held by Roman Knoll, an excellent expert in Eastern European affairs. We could not refrain from mentioning yet another outstanding expert in eastern affairs, namely Leon Wasilewski, vice-chairman of the Polish delegation, a socialist and close associate of Piłsudski. An expert in economic and financial matters was Stanislaw Kauzik, Secretary General of the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers. An advocate of a hard-line approach towards the Soviets was Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade, Henryk Strasburger. Critics of the tactics employed by Dąbksi during the talks with the Soviet delegation included Matuszewski and Knoll, who believed that the head of the Polish
delegation was inclined to make excessive concessions to Joffe\textsuperscript{32}. On the other hand, the Soviet delegation teemed with prominent figures of the Bolshevik elite, only to mention Dmitry Manuilsky\textsuperscript{33}, who represented Soviet Ukraine, the economic expert and diplomat Yakov Hanetsky\textsuperscript{34}, and Leonid Obolensky, later to become the plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw\textsuperscript{35}. It is also worth noting a lesser-known representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Emanuel Kviring, who sent interesting reports from Riga to Kharkov, which revealed the true face of Soviet policy towards Poland, especially towards the lands inhabited by the Ukrainian minority\textsuperscript{36}. Both delegations were accompanied by a wide circle of experts and advisors. At the backstage of the main debates, a battle between Polish and Soviet intelligence services took place\textsuperscript{37}. Correspondents of the Polish, Soviet and foreign press were also present; however, their number was considerably smaller than in the case of the Paris Peace Conference, which, on the one hand, demonstrated that international opinion was not that interested in the conference in Riga, and, on the other hand, limited the dissemination of information about the proceedings.

The Polish-Soviet peace negotiations, which started as early as in August 1920 in Minsk and continued later in Riga, a neutral ground for both sides, did not take place in isolation from the situation at the front lines, and then from the changes taking place both internationally and within the states that participated in the peace conference. The Soviet side imposed very strict cease-fire conditions on the Poles as the Red Army was fighting the Polish Army on the outskirts of Warsaw and Lviv in August 1920 and the balance of the war tipped in favour of Moscow. This rhetoric changed almost immediately after the military defeat suffered by the Soviet forces near Warsaw, which resulted in the transfer of the peace conference to Riga\textsuperscript{38}. The battle on the Niemen River, which was won by the Poles, and the offensive in Volhynia and Podolia in September and early October 1920, forced the Bolsheviks to sign the preliminary peace as soon as possible, and thus to make more concessions. On 2 October, Lenin issued directives to Joffe to agree to a demarcation line favourable to

\textsuperscript{32} H. Bartoszewicz, op. cit., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{33} К. А. Залесский, op. cit., p. 381.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., pp. 135–136.
\textsuperscript{38} Dokumenty do historii stosunków polsko-sowieckich 1918–1945, t. 1, cz. 1, p. 502.
Poland, and to hand over to the Poles a railway line that connected the towns of Lida and Baranavichi, which was important from the militarily point of view, on condition that the preliminary peace be signed within just three days. This haste was justified. The idea was to move some Red Army troops from the Western Front as quickly as possible against the army of Whites commanded by General Pyotr Wrangel. The Bolsheviks managed to achieve their goal with only a slight delay, as the preliminary peace was signed on 12 October 1920, which they treated as the starting point for further peace negotiations, and the demarcation line separating the two warring sides as the future Polish-Soviet border. The provisions of the preliminary peace came into force on 18 October and the fighting on the Polish-Soviet front ended. Both the takeover of Vilnius by the Poles at the beginning of October 1920 and the support for the White Ukrainian and Russian troops that continued fighting against the Red Army in November 1920 became the subject of heated disputes during the negotiations in Riga. The Bolsheviks drove General Wrangel’s troops out of Crimea in mid-November 1920, which was their undoubted success. Ultimately, this tipped the balance of victory in the Russian Civil War in their favour. One did not have to wait long for the results. The Soviet delegation in Riga took a firmer stance in the negotiations and became much more intransigent. This slowed down the negotiations, which at the turn of 1921 were at risk of being broken off. However, other factors that influenced the course of the negotiations in Riga soon emerged. The Polish side planned to conclude them before the planned plebiscite in Upper Silesia on 20 March 1921. The intention was to demonstrate to the inhabitants of that region that Poland was not a ‘seasonal state’ and had settled all its international relations, so as to contradict the anti-Polish stereotypes of the Republic of Poland as an unstable and chaotic state disseminated by German propaganda. The Soviet side, meanwhile, had to reckon not only with a deep economic crisis, but also with the dissatisfaction of many peasants with Bolshevik rule and a sailors’ mutiny in Kronstadt that broke out in early March 1921 and was violently suppressed by the Red Army. With the timing of the upcoming plebiscite in Upper Silesia and the reaction of international opinion to a possible delay in signing a peace treaty with Poland in mind, it was not without reason that Joffe wrote to Lenin and Chicherin in mid-March 1921: “The matter is as follows: it is either we who will spoil our position in London, Paris and Warsaw, receiving nothing in return from the Germans or, by not doing so, we will teach the Germans a lesson that

40 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1921, nr 28, entry no. 161; Документы внешней политики СССР, т. 3, pp. 245–258.
no services should be expected of us for free, and I have chosen the latter. I re-
peat that the date for the signing [of the peace treaty – M.W.] has already been 
fixed for the 18th [March 1921 – M.W.] and evading this will mean an open 
demonstration of our agreement with Germany.

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In July 1920, the Polish Prime Minister Władysław Grabski went to Spa in 
Belgium to ask the Entente Powers to become intermediaries in the talks with 
the Bolsheviks, which would result in stopping the offensive and signing an 
armistice. At that time, the Red Army was approaching Warsaw, and the fate of 
the newly recreated Republic of Poland was at stake. The initiative of mediating 
in negotiations with the Soviet side was taken by the reserved Prime Min-
ister of Great Britain, David Lloyd George, who had long been preoccupied 
with the idea of signing economic agreements with Soviet Russia that would be 
beneficial to his country. The terms of the armistice were extremely disagree-
able to the Polish side, which was forced to make concessions to the Czechs in 
Cieszyn Silesia, the Lithuanians in Vilnius Region and the Germans in the Free 
City of Danzig. In a note sent to Moscow on 11 July, British Foreign Minister 
Lord George Nathaniel Curzon proposed a line that would separate the war-
ing armies as one of the conditions for an armistice, freely handing over Eastern 
Galicia to the Soviets, of which he failed to inform not only Grabski but 
even the French: ‘This line runs approximately as follows: – Grodno, Yalovka, 
Niemirov, Brest-Litovsk, Dorohusk, Ustilug, east of Grubeshov, Krilov, and 
thence west of Rawa-Ruska, east of Przemysl to Carpathians. North of Grodno 
the line will be held by the Lithuanians will run along the railway running from Grodno to Vilna and thence to Dvinsk. On the other hand the armi-
stice should provide that the armies of Soviet Russia should stand at a distance 
of 50 kilometres to the East of this line. In Eastern Galicia each army will stand 
on the line which they occupy at the date of the signature of the armistice.’

The Soviets rejected the British offer of mediation, but the line, known 
since then as the Curzon Line, remains a symbol of the attitude of the En-
tente Powers to Polish territorial aspirations in the east. This was not without 
reason. In Western European countries and the United States, Polish terri-

tory was associated with the territory of the former Kingdom of Poland that 
formed part of the Russian Empire. The Curzon Line was the best proof of this.

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42 ‘Вопрос стоит так: либо мы, ничего не получая от немцев, испорти м обное положе-
ние в Лондоне, Париже и Варшаве, либо мы, не делая этого, проучим немцев, доказав им, 
что задаром от нас услуг ждать нельзя, и я выбрал последнее. Повторяю, что теперь под-
писанное на 18-е уже назначено, а не делать этого означает ярко продемонстрировать свое 
Moreover, it was treated as an ethnographic border that defined *ex cathedra* the extent of the Polish population in Eastern Europe. There was no complete recognition of the fact that there were not only Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians living to the east of this line. Several million Poles also lived there in large groups. They predominated not only in the larger cities such as Vilnius and Lviv, but also in many regions or smaller towns in the Vilnius Region, Novogrudok Region, Volhynia, Podolia and Eastern Galicia. Aristocrats, landowners and intelligentsia by no means constituted the majority of the Poles living east of the Curzon Line. Instead, most Poles there were peasants, who, like their Lithuanian, Belarusian or Ukrainian neighbours, lived off farming.

In the West, however, it was not so much the Poles that were listened to as the White Russian émigrés, still influential among the leaders of the former Triple Entente. Meanwhile, Russian emigrants allowed for the existence of an independent Polish state only within the borders of the former Kingdom of Poland, emphasising its ethnographic, and therefore Polish, character. This was expressed by the Russian Political Conference, which brought together various anti-Bolshevik forces that included eminent figures of the former Russian political scene such as Sergey Sazonov – Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire until 1916, Georgy Lvov – Prime Minister of the Provisional Government in 1917, and Vasily Maklakov – an influential politician who represented the Constitutional Democratic Party. During the Paris Peace Conference, Russian emigrants issued memoranda to the leaders of the victorious coalition in which they wrote: ‘[…] neither questions concerning the territories of the Russian Empire within the 1914 borders, with the exception of ethnographic Poland [emphasis – M.W.], nor questions concerning the future status of the nationalities within these borders, can be resolved without the consent of the Russian people. No final solution can therefore be applied to this matter until the Russian people are able to freely express their will and participate in the solution of these questions’44.

It should therefore come as no surprise that the majority of Russian émigrés described the demarcation line drawn in the preliminary peace, and then the Polish-Soviet border outlined in the Treaty of Riga, as being much too far to the east, and compared with the decisions of the Treaty of Brest of March 1918 signed by the Bolsheviks and the Central Powers, and therefore treated

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44 ‘[…] toutes les questions concernant les territoires de l’Empire Russe dans les limites de 1914 à l’exception de la Pologne ethnographique, de même que les questions relatives au statut futur des nationalités incluses dans ces limites, ne peuvent être resolues en dehors et sans le consentement du peuple Russe. Aucune solution définitive ne saurait par conséquent intervenir à ce sujet tant que le peuple Russe ne sera pas en état de manifester librement sa volonté et de participer au règlement de ces questions'; *Dokumenty do historii stosunków polsko-sowieckich 1918–1945*, t. 1, cz. 1, p. 115.
it as a division of the former Russian Empire that had been made without the consent of the Russian people, as noted in the memorandum quoted above45.

Moscow proposed direct Polish-Soviet negotiations, while at the same time postponing replying to the notes from Polish Foreign Minister Eustachy Sapieha. Time was playing in favour of the Bolsheviks, and every day of delay brought them closer to capturing Warsaw, which in their opinion was equivalent to the final defeat of Poland and opening the way to the west and south of Europe. After some perturbations regarding the reception of the first Polish delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Władysław Wróblewski, the Soviet authorities agreed to receive a second delegation with a broader mandate, headed by Dąbski, in Minsk. Karl Daniszewski, a Latvian Bolshevik of Polish origin, dictated the conditions of the armistice and the conclusion of the preliminary peace, called the ‘peace theses’, which in practice made the Republic of Poland dependent on Moscow: a border along the Curzon Line with a possibility of slight deviations in Poland’s favour, reduction of the Polish Army from nearly a million to 50,000 soldiers, handing over the surplus armaments to the Soviets, creation of a citizens’ militia made of workers, and ensuring extraterritorial rail transit from Russia to Germany46. The latter condition was more than symptomatic, since it was intended to guarantee to the Bolsheviks an unfettered opportunity to provide support to the German revolutionary movement without consulting the partition separating Soviet Russia from the Weimar Republic, which they considered Poland to be. They would repeat this condition in the future, both during the negotiations in Riga, and in autumn 1923 during the so-called ‘German October’. Daniszewski’s theses should be treated as an expression of the real intentions of the Soviets towards Poland in the period of the Red Army’s victorious advance, and at the same time as a starting point for further deliberations. Obviously, these conditions were rejected by the Polish delegation.

It is also worth mentioning that Lev Trotsky was in favour of keeping the members of the Polish delegation in Minsk behind barbed wire, like prisoners of war. However, Soviet diplomats headed by Chicherin protested against this idea with Lenin himself. The head of Soviet diplomacy suggested designating a few houses and streets in the city for Poles in such a way that they would not be able to meet with outsiders, and also surrounding them with a group of trusted guards; in other words to keep them not so much behind a barbed wire as in an ‘invisible golden cage’. He justified his proposal by the need to avoid scandal and embarrassment for the Bolsheviks in the eyes of the ‘whole

46 J. Dąbski, op. cit., pp. 48–52.
Polish nation’ and the ‘English trade-unionists’ if the methods proposed by Trotsky were applied. Unsurprisingly, after the situation on the battlefields had changed in favour of the Polish Army, the Polish delegation demanded that the negotiations be moved to neutral Riga.

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The Polish-Soviet border established in Riga was a compromise. It was undoubtedly one of the most important items on the agenda of the peace negotiations: the border line was regulated by an extensive second article of the peace treaty. The Soviet side was willing to make small territorial concessions, hoping in return for Polish concessions in financial and economic matters. Among the members of the Polish delegation, there were many supporters of the federation concept promoted earlier by Pilsudski’s political camp (Leon Wasilewski, Witold Kamieniecki, Ignacy Matuszewski, Waclaw Jędrzejewicz, Marian Szumlakowski and Roman Knoll), the essence of which was to build independent states between Poland and Russia, whose existence would weaken the Russian potential and provide a security buffer for Poland. However, the slogans of federalism were put aside because it was recognised that their implementation was impossible under the existing conditions, which was influenced by the experiences of the years 1918–1920 in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. The federalists realised that bringing them forward would delay and perhaps even prevent the conclusion of a peace treaty with the Bolsheviks. The only effective form of pressure could be the resumption of military operations. However, Poland could not afford to continue the war. Its economic and military potential was too weak to be able to maintain a powerful army and conduct warfare in the conditions of the approaching winter. Pilsudski understood that perfectly, and thus his supporters did not propose inviting representatives of the allied Ukrainian People’s Republic, headed by Otaman Symon Petliura, to the negotiations. They knew that the Soviets would not agree to this, which would jeopardise any chance of concluding peace. Besides, this was not in line with the policy of National Democracy, which was represented in Riga by the influential Stanisław Grabski, but also by Adam Mieczkowski. The concept of incorporation promoted by the National Democrats and condoned by Pilsudski’s camp as the minimalistic plan regarding the eastern borderlands of the Republic of Poland prevailed. Simply put, it could be said that the concept of incorporation boiled down to establishing a border to the east of lands dominated by Polish culture and inhabited by Slavic minorities that were to be polonised. These minorities consisted of Ukrainians, most often and deliberately called ‘Ruthenians’ by the National Democracy supporters,

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and Belarusians. National Democrats denied both of these national groups the right to have their own state. Such an attitude had consequences. Most Ukrainian and Belarusian politicians and activists, irrespective of their affiliations, regarded the border established in Riga to be a line that artificially divided the territory inhabited by these nations between the Bolshevik states, then the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Poland. This narrative is still dominant in Ukrainian and Belarusian historiography, which is hardly surprising. On the one hand, it gave impetus to the development of Ukrainian nationalism against both Poles and Soviets, and on the other, it was a driving force for anti-Polish propaganda controlled from Moscow, which was spread beyond the areas of the Soviet Union inhabited by Ukrainians and Belarusians. Little or nothing in this respect was changed by the fact that, by signing the peace treaty in Riga, the Republic of Poland officially recognised Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belarus as separate entities.

It is not true that the Soviet delegation was eager to make major territorial concessions to Poland in the belief that sooner or later these lands would return under Moscow’s control anyway, and that Poland would be weaker because of the numerous members of national minorities living there and opposing its rule. In the first place, there is the question of Minsk and its surroundings, which Joffe supposedly wanted to give back to the Poles, especially since this city was occupied by the troops of the Polish Army which later withdrew from it. Jerzy Borzęcki’s research in the post-Soviet archives showed unequivocally that the Soviet delegation, following the directives coming from Moscow, was not only unwilling to give up Minsk, but also did not intend to make major territorial concessions to Poland elsewhere. As I mentioned above, it only made some concessions in minor territorial disputes.

The key question that remains is the following: did the Soviets actually come to terms with the border agreed upon in Riga, or did they treat it as a temporary solution that would sooner or later change in their favour? Daniszewski’s ‘peace theses’ quoted above were very telling in this regard. However, this is not the only source that provides an answer to the question posed above. It suffices to look at the correspondence sent by the Soviet delegation to its superiors during the negotiations in Riga. As early as at the end of November 1920, the aforementioned Soviet Ukrainian delegate Kviring drafted a paper titled The tasks of our party in Ukrainian territories occupied by Poland,

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50 J. Borzęcki, op.cit., pp. 131–133.
having in mind the territories remaining within the borders of the Republic of Poland under the preliminary peace, and later under the Treaty of Riga, with an emphasis on Volhynia and the former Eastern Galicia. In his paper Kviring wrote: ‘The detachment from the Ukrainian Socialist Republic of a large part of Volhynia, with a Ukrainian population of several million souls, and the incorporation of eastern Galicia into Poland, present our party and government with a new task: to take under its ideological and organisational leadership the revolutionary movement which will inevitably grow in these areas as a result of the Polish occupation. […]

In my opinion, a special committee should be formed immediately to carry out party work in the occupied Ukrainian districts, but it should act as an independent organisation so that Poland does not nit-pick.

The slogans of this movement should be simplified and necessarily linked to the national awareness of the peasant masses: against the Polish master, for land for the Ukrainian peasants, for the power of the councils, i.e. the Ukrainian peasantry in the name of the unification of the territories detached from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, i.e. in the name of the state unification of all the working masses of Ukraine and the organisation of the Galician Soviet Socialist Republic. In all this agitation, the national aspect should occupy the most prominent place. The means of conducting the fight include armed insurrection and, consequently, the organisation of revolutionary committees.

The occupied region, however, cannot win by its own efforts. What is needed is support, which we should provide.51

The very terms used by a member of the Soviet delegation – ‘territories occupied by Poland’, ‘Polish occupation’ – are particularly significant and shed

51 ‘Отторжение от УССР значительной части Волыни с украинским населением в несколько миллионов душ и присоединение Восточной Галиции к Польше – ставят перед нашей партией и правительством новую задачу: взять под свое идейное и организационное руководство революционное движение, которое в результате польской оккупации будет неизбежно нарастать в этих районах. […]

По-моему, нужно немедленно выделить особый комитет для ведения партийной работы в оккупированных украинских областях, причем, чтобы Польша не могла к нам придаться, он должен выступать как самостоятельная организация.

Лозунги движения должны быть упрощены и неизбежно связаны с национальным сознанием крестьянских масс: против польского пана, за землю для украинского крестьянина, за власть советов, т.е. украинского крестьянства во имя объединения отторженных районов с УССР, т.е. во имя государственного объединения всех трудящихся масс Украины и организации Галицкой Советской Социалистической Республики. Национальный момент должен, во всей агитации, занять виднейшее место. Средства борьбы – вооруженное восстание и, следовательно, организация ревкомов.

light on the real intentions of the Soviet authorities. In a peculiar paradox, the Bolsheviks, just like their political opponents, i.e. the Whites (with a few exceptions), were willing to recognise the existence of Poland, but only west of the Curzon Line. In the concepts of Soviet leaders such as Lenin and later Joseph Stalin, however, Poland could only exist as a country dependent on Moscow, or at least one that guaranteed its free communication with Germany, which was key to extending the Bolshevik revolution to the countries of Western Europe. From this perspective, the border determined in Riga was for Soviet politicians and diplomats a temporary, transitional and unwanted solution; put simply, a tight corset restraining their movements. This was confirmed by the events of 1939–1945.

The issues of financial and material settlements generated much controversy. First and foremost, there was the issue of paying the dues for the active participation of the Polish lands in the economic life of the former Russian Empire (regulated in thirteenth article of the treaty). During the negotiations taking place in Riga, Polish representatives put forward a sum of around 300 million roubles in gold for, as they said at the time, ‘the active balance of the Kingdom’ in the economic development of the Russian Empire. However, the Poles’ calculations were torpedoed by the Soviets who insisted on an amount ten times lower, i.e. 30 million roubles in gold, stressing the dire economic situation of the states ruled by the Bolsheviks and the real possibilities of repaying their financial obligations. Moscow would most willingly have paid with economic concession agreements instead of cash. ‘We will not give gold, only concessions’ are famous words written by Chicherin to Joffe in mid-November 1920. In the end, the Polish delegates, with the agreement of their superiors in Warsaw, set the amount of their dues at 85 million roubles in gold, which was a significant concession to their Soviet partners. However, no compromise was reached on this issue either, since the Soviet delegation still insisted on 30 million roubles in gold. This amount was also included in the final version of the articles of the peace treaty. It was an unquestionable success of the Soviet negotiators. However, it soon turned out that the Polish side would not obtain a single rouble from this amount. In April 1922, Soviet diplomacy put forward a counter-argument, stating that Poland had to pay the costs incurred as a result of the actions of sabotage bands, supported by

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54 Ibid., p. 720.
Warsaw, in the territory of the Bolshevik states, which allegedly exceeded the sum granted to the Republic of Poland under the Treaty of Riga. The Poles then made demands for compensation for the actions of Soviet saboteurs. The exchange of mutual grievances came to no fruition, and the talks that lasted in the following years went astray.

The second issue that fell within the scope of financial settlements was the return of state-owned railway property from Russia and Ukraine to Poland (regulated by fourteenth article). The value of the so-called railway property was precisely set at 29 million roubles in gold. A commitment was also made to the mutual return of river and road transport property, the value of which, however, was smaller. An additional annex specified the number of steam locomotives, passenger and freight carriages to be returned, as well as the amount to be compensated for other railway property. This included property taken away also during the evacuation of Russian troops from the territory of the Kingdom of Poland following the offensive of the Central Powers in 1915. The aforementioned amount was divided into three instalments. The Soviets paid the first instalment with delay in November 1921, after several leaders of the anti-Bolshevik movement had been expelled from Poland at its express request, as stipulated in a separate protocol signed by Dąbski and the Soviet Plenipotentiary in Warsaw, Lev Karakhan⁵⁷. The second instalment, also late, was paid in April 1922. The Soviets never paid the third instalment, explaining their position in the same way as they did in the case of payments for the active participation of the Polish lands in the economic development of the former Russian Empire⁵⁸.

Another obligation taken on by the Soviets was to return the property of self-governing bodies, municipal councils, institutions, natural and legal persons, and to settle accounts related to the funds and capital bequeathed and donated to Polish legal and natural citizens, as well as related to contributions, deposits and security deposits of Polish legal and natural persons in Russian and Ukrainian state, nationalized or liquidated credit institutions, as well as in state institutions and funds. These issues were regulated by articles from fifteenth to eighteenth. After the First World War, after the mass evacuation of the population of the Kingdom in 1915 deep into the Romanov Empire, after the events of the Russian Civil War, and finally after the end of the Polish-Soviet War of 1918/1919–1921, proving ownership was in many cases extremely

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difficult, and sometimes simply impossible. It is worth adding here that the Soviets tried hard to weaken Polish arguments, seeking its own claims against Poland. No wonder that Warsaw asked for a postponement of the deadline for submitting its claims, which was motivated by the delay in starting the work of the Mixed Re-evacuation Committee. Large sums of money were at stake. It was calculated that, as of 16 October 1917, they amounted to about 120 million roubles in savings books (the number of which was put at 620,000) in the form of deposits, and about 24.5 million roubles in the form of deposited securities. In October 1922, Obolensky even declared that the Soviet side would be ready to make an advance payment to Poland towards the dues resulting from the implementation of, among other, sixteenth and seventeenth articles of the Treaty of Riga. The return of the facilities 'evacuated' deep into Russia when leaving the Kingdom of Poland in 1915 was very slow. It was literally necessary to fight for every factory, every machine and every object. At the beginning of 1923, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Warsaw calculated that Poland had obtained only no more than 3% of the machinery due to it. A few months later, a memorandum prepared in this ministry bitterly stated: “The efforts of the Polish delegation in the Mixed Settlement Committee, which, pursuant to eighteenth article was entrusted with the settlement under sixteenth, seventeenth (settlement of funds and capitals of Polish public institutions and Polish natural and legal persons in Russian and Ukrainian state credit and cash institutions) and eighteenth articles (settlement of various detailed provisions of the treaty) have so far proved unsuccessful.

Although a year and a half has passed since the commencement of the work of the Committee, nothing has been settled. The issues the settling of which the Russian side has constantly evaded are of great concern to broad sections of the population, e.g. the settlement of deposits in savings banks, which concerns 600,000 citizens of Poland.

60 Ibid., pp. 522–526.
63 'Wysiłki delegacji polskiej w Mieszaną Komisji Rozrachunkowej, której stosownie do art. XVIII. powierzono dokonanie roszczenku z art. XVI, XVII (rozrachunek z tytułu funduszy i kapitałów polskich instytucji publicznych i polskich osób fizycznych i prawnych w państwowych instytucjach kredytowych i kasowych rosyjskich i ukraińskich) i XVIII (rozrachunek z tytułu różnych szczegółowych postanowień traktatu) okazały się dotychczas bezskuteczne.
Again, the affairs were again in a deadlock, which was aptly defined by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Karol Bertoni, with regard to the returns and settlements: ‘It must be remembered that Russia does not fulfil its obligations without coercion’\(^64\). As a result, the Polish authorities were forced to agree to a significant reduction of the obligations to return property taken to Russia before 1917. The relevant agreement was signed in Moscow in August 1924.

Perhaps the most blatant manifestation of a ruthlessly negative attitude towards the implementation of the Treaty of Riga provisions by the Soviet authorities was their approach to the obligations under sixteenth and seventeenth articles, i.e. the financial settlements concerning hundreds of thousands of citizens of the Republic of Poland. The Soviets clutched at various ways of getting rid of the unwanted burden, even by manipulating the value of the rouble, this time not based on gold parity. In January 1924, the Soviet side put forward a proposal to cover all Polish claims with a ‘cheque for 1190 dollars’, at the same time attempting unilaterally, and thus contrary to the Treaty of Riga, to limit the deadline for Poles to submit claims. When this stratagem proved unsuccessful, Moscow resorted to another method, namely avoidance to convene meetings of the Mixed Settlement Committee and not replying to the note of the Polish side of 25 October 1924. These actions went hand in hand with Moscow’s determined efforts to abolish the financial clauses of the Treaty of Riga, to which Warsaw was unwilling to agree\(^65\). As in the case of thirteenth and fourteenth articles, which were not implemented by the Soviets, a deadlock ensued, and the Polish side practically ceased to press the issue.

The clauses concerning the return of cultural heritage taken to Russia and Ukraine as of 1 January 1772, i.e. after the first partition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (regulated in eleventh article), were a kind of novelty in the international agreements signed after the First World War\(^66\). As far as

\(^{64}\) Ibid., p. 444.

\(^{65}\) Dokumenty do historii stosunków polsko-sowieckich 1918–1945, t. 1, cz. 2, pp. 504–505.

the reclamation of cultural property was concerned, the Soviets were more willing to return the relics of the past related to the history of the Kingdom of Poland, i.e. the lands recognised by them as ethnically Polish, but was reluctant to return the property associated with lands located east of the Curzon Line. Of course, the Soviets did not always do this consistently, and sometimes divided archival and art collections. A typical example of this was handing over the books of *Metrica of the Kingdom of Poland* while keeping the volumes of the *Metrica of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania*. Moreover, the so-called *Metrica of Volhynia* (Ruthenia) was partitioned out of the *Metrica of the Kingdom of Poland*, although the former was an integral part of the latter, as it concerned the territories inhabited by Ukrainians. This was not made, however, for the *Metrica of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania*, which remained in Soviet hands in its entirety, although a considerable part of the territory of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania was within the borders of the recreated Republic of Poland. The return of the *Metrica of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania* was sought through diplomatic means with the participation of the heads of Polish diplomacy. The Foreign Minister Marian Seyda even put this issue as one of the conditions for the implementation of the Treaty of Riga in connection with the *de iure* recognition of the Soviet Union by Poland in 1923. It was of little use. To this day, the metricals concerning Lithuania and Volhynia are kept in the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents in Moscow. Another example is the collection of the Kremenets Liceum, including the rich library and museum artefacts taken to Kiev in 1833 as part of the repressions following the November Uprising and the Polish-Russian War of 1830–1831. In this case, the Soviets cited Ukrainian scholars who stressed the importance of the Kremenets artefacts for the Ukrainian people. To date, the book collection and other historical artefacts of the Kremenets Liceum are stored in Kiev, as is the former Kiev Central Archive, which includes land and municipal registers from Volhynia. There are many more such examples.

Polish lawyers and diplomats, followed by some historians, have formulated the opinion that the negotiators of the Treaty of Riga made a serious and grave mistake of not establishing sanctions for the failure to implement its provisions. I do not share this opinion, because even the inclusion of such sanctions would not be equivalent to their effective enforcement. The solution could have been the resumption of military operations, but none of the war-weary parties was able to take such drastic measures. The Soviet authorities were aware of that and from the very beginning deliberately used all possibilities to renege on their obligations towards Poland. This was most painfully felt

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by the representatives of the Polish minority who lived in the Soviet Union,68 and by the clergy of the Catholic Church.69

During the negotiations in Riga, another very important issue was settled, namely, the repatriation of the population. The relevant agreement was signed less than a month before the conclusion of the peace treaty, i.e. on 24 February 1921.70 It regulated the principles of returning hostages, civilian prisoners of war, internees, prisoners of war, exiles, refugees and emigrants to their respective countries, defining each of the above groups in detail. Repatriation was to be handled by two specially appointed mixed committees operating in Moscow and Warsaw. The exodus of people from Russia to the recreated Republic of Poland began long before the conclusion of the Treaty of Riga and lasted almost until mid-1924. According to detailed calculations by Cezary Żołędowski, 734,886 people arrived in the Republic of Poland from the former Russian Empire from the day of Poland’s regaining independence, i.e. from 11 November 1918 to 30 September 1921, and 529,845 repatriates and re-emigrants from 1 October 1921 to 31 May 1924. This gives a total of 1,264,731 people. The largest group was not constituted by Poles (469,558, i.e. 37.1%), but Belarusians (491,713, i.e. 38.9%). Apart from the representatives of these two nations, Ukrainians (123,883, or 9.8%), Russians (122,674, or 9.7%), Jews (33,439, or 2.6%) and Lithuanians (8,657, or 0.7%) also returned to Poland. The remainder were the representatives of other nationalities and persons of undetermined nationality (14,807 or 1.2%).71 Approximately one million Poles and people of Polish origin remained in the territory of the future Soviet Union, although official statistics understated this number. The prisoners of war from the Red Army taken by the Poles and the prisoners of war from the Russian Army from the First World War returned to the Soviet Union. Their number is difficult to estimate, although in the case of the former group we can speak of 65,797 Soviet prisoners of war repatriated from Poland between March and October 1921.72

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Signed in Riga on 18 March 1921, the peace treaty that ended the Polish-Soviet War of 1918/1919–1920 was signed by representatives of three states: the Republic of Poland, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. On 14 April 1921, the treaty was ratified by the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, a day later by the Polish Legislative Sejm – the Chief of State Józef Piłsudski put his signature to it on 16 April together with the countersignature of the Foreign Minister Eustachy Sapieha – and on 17 April by the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. On 30 April 1921, the ratified documents were exchanged, and this date is regarded as the day the provisions of the peace treaty came into force. On 12 August 1921, the Treaty of Riga was registered at the League of Nations Secretariat. It was only in March 1923, after lengthy efforts by Polish diplomacy, that the border agreed upon in Riga was recognised by the great European powers: Great Britain, France and Italy. This was not tantamount to granting it a guarantee of inviolability, however. In London, Paris and Rome, it was believed that the Polish-Soviet border established in Riga had been moved too far eastwards and that it was in fact a bone of contention between Poland and the Soviet Union, and that sooner or later might become a source of new armed conflict.

The treaty was an extensive document negotiated over the period of six months. It regulated many detailed issues, the discussion of which would extend beyond the narrow confines of this article. It was undoubtedly one of the most important documents signed by Poland in the interwar period. It defined relations between neighbouring states that had been at war with each other for nearly two years. For the Republic of Poland, this was a war for literally everything: to save the state recently re-established after the partitions of the eighteenth century, to preserve its independence, sovereignty and subjectivity; simply to survive. The significance of the Peace Treaty of Riga for Soviet Russia was probably smaller than for Poland, which does not mean it was minor. The Polish diplomatic apparatus treated the Treaty of Riga as the cornerstone of relations with the eastern neighbour, making sure to refer to it in other documents signed with the Soviets, such as the non-aggression pact of 1932, and to emphasise that ‘it was the basis of their mutual relations and obligations to date’. However, the Treaty of Riga goes well beyond bilateral Polish-Soviet relations, and that is where its historical significance should be found.

Translated by Tomasz Leszczuk and Piotr Puchalski

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73 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1921, nr 49, entry no. 300; Документы внешней политики СССР, т. 3, pp. 618–658.
75 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, 1932, nr 115, entry no. 951.
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