

ARTICLES

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THE MILITARY EXPEDITION OF KRZYSZTOF RADZIWIŁŁ
“PIORUN” TO LIVONIA IN THE WINTER OF 1579*

Słowa kluczowe: *itinerary*, military cartography, *Kierepec* [Kirempē], Dorpat, Livonia of the 16th century

In the article I present the expedition of Krzysztof Radziwiłł nicknamed “Piorun” [Polish: ‘thunder’] to Dorpat [Tartu] in the winter of 1579. The problem has been discussed briefly in the literature of the subject matter¹. Nevertheless, I would like to analyse this expedition using the itinerary hitherto unknown to scholars². The source changes completely our notion of this con-

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¹ Marek FERENC, *Mikołaj Radziwiłł „Rudy” (1515–1584)*, Kraków 2008, pp. 574–575; Piotr ŁABĘDŹ, *Działalność wojskowa Krzysztofa Radziwiłła „Pioruna” w latach 1572–11579*, *Zapiski Historyczne* (further cit. ZH), t. 76: 2011, z. 1, pp. 36–37; Henryk KOTARSKI, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflanckiej 1576–1582. Sprawy organizacyjne. Część II*, *Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości*, t. 17: 1971, cz. 1 (further cit. H. KOTARSKI, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie* [cz. 2]), pp. 74–75; Dariusz KUPISZ, *Połock 1579*, Warszawa 2003, pp. 98–99; Tadeusz KORZON, *Dzieje wojen i wojskowości w Polsce*, t. 2, Kraków 1912, p. 33; Henryk LULEWICZ, *Radziwiłł Krzysztof zwany Piorunem*, [in:] *Polski słownik biograficzny* (further cit. PSB), t. 30, Wrocław 1987, pp. 264–276; Marek PLEWCZYŃSKI, *Wkład Radziwiłłów w rozwój staropolskiej sztuki wojennej XVI w.*, *Miscellanea Historico-Archivistica*, t. 7: 1997, pp. 33–34.

² Российская национальная библиотека, Санкт-Петербург [The National Library of Russia, St. Petersburg] (further cit. PHB), Ф. 971, Авт. 321/1, № 9, к. 8. Stanisław Alexandrowicz introduced the information about the source. He established the target point and made a list of some towns and villages connected with the expedition of Krzysztof Radziwiłł ‘Piorun’ conducted at the beginning of 1579. This outstanding expert in military cartography failed to analyse the source in the context of military actions, see: Stanisław ALEXANDROWICZ, *Rozwój kartografii Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego od XV do połowy XVIII wieku*, Poznań 1989, p. 193; idem, *Kartografia Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego od XV do połowy XVIII wieku*, Warszawa 2012, p. 170.

frontation, showing the skill of using the art of manoeuvres – the practical ability to carry out complicated operational actions, including the strategic ones. From the point of view of the history of cartography, it is vital to confirm the hypothesis that planning military actions was based on maps, or, broadly speaking, on geographical knowledge.

Another significant source complementing our knowledge about this expedition is the drawing showing the seizure of the castle of Kiremppe [Polish: Kierepeć, Estonian: Kirumpää, German: Kirrumpäh] in 1579, acquired by the Museum of the Army in Warsaw in 1993³. The source was created in the years 1784–1791, when Stanisław August Poniatowski ordered drawings presenting pictures found in the collections of the Radziwiłł family⁴. The poem of Andrzej Rymsza, hitherto not used, titled *Deketeros akroama, to jest dziesięćroczna powieść wojennych spraw oświeconego ksiąźęcia i pana, pana Krzysztofa Radziwiła* had a major factual significance⁵. It must be underlined that the artist was not only a client of the house of the Radziwiłłs of Birże [Lit. Biržai], but also a soldier participating in the expeditions organized by Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” in the years 1579–1581⁶.

A particular case of the art of manoeuvres, to my mind – momentous, was the military expedition of Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” to Livonia in the winter of 1579. The first plan to send advance soldiers was designed in January 1579 by Andrzej Sapieha. He intended to set off to Dorpat with the army of about 1,300 horses. Krzysztof Radziwiłł, taking over the command over the “Livonian” army, held up the project and decided to prepare the offensive action on a larger scale. He informed the grand crown chancellor Jan Zamoyski and his father (Mikołaj Radziwiłł) about the intention to carry out an attack on Dorpat, where the Russian army of ca. 6,000 cavalrymen and 2,000 infantrymen was supposed to station. His intention was to defeat the army (in the field) and to ravage the adjacent territories. The final decision was made by

³ Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie [Polish Army Museum in Warsaw], nr inw. 16596 A*; the description below the drawing was published in: Teofil ŻEBRAWSKI, *O pieczęciach dawnej Polski i Litwy*, Kraków 1865, p. 53, nr 8 (it is a supplement to a book with a different entry number).

⁴ Marek A. JANICKI, *Obraz Bitwa pod Orszą – geneza, datowanie, wzory graficzne a obraz bitwy „na Kropiwniej” i inne przedstawienia batalistyczne w wileńskim pałacu Radziwiłłów*, [in:] *Bitwa pod Orszą*, red. Mirosław NAGIELSKI (Biblioteka Epoki Nowożytnej, nr 3), Warszawa 2015, pp. 212–217.

⁵ Wojciech Ryszard RZEPKA, Alojzy SAJKOWSKI, *Andrzeja Rymszy „Dziesięćroczna powieść wojennych spraw...” (1585)*, [in:] *Miscellanea staropolskie*, t. 4, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk 1972, pp. 121–132. The source text: *ibid.*, pp. 133–224.

⁶ Henryk LULEWICZ, *Rymsza Andrzej h. Gozdawa*, [in:] PSB, t. 33, Wrocław 1991–1992, pp. 532–533.

Stefan Batory, who, in this way, wanted to concentrate the attention of the Russians on Livonia in the face of the planned attack on Polotsk⁷.

Not much is known about the course of the expedition. Historians agree on the size of the regiment estimating it at 2,250 cavalrymen (2,050 hussars, 150 cavalrymen "petyhorcy" and 50 Cossacks); yet, the infantry and artillery are not mentioned⁸. Moreover, according to the sources the concentration of the army took place somewhere in the vicinity of the Middle Daugava (Dariusz Kupisz, Piotr Łabędź), and the expedition lasted from February to mid-March 1579. The result of the actions of the army of Krzysztof Radziwiłł was the extensive ravage near Dorpat and the conquest of the castle of Kierepeć [Lit. Kirrepa]. The most frequently repeated information indicates that "Piorun" conquered the fortifications on 11 February (Henryk Lulewicz, Marek Plewczyński), or on 2–3 March (Piotr Łabędź). Scholars cannot agree on the chronology of the events. Kupisz indicates that the castle was conquered first, next the territories of Dorpat were ravaged. On the other hand, Piotr Łabędź and Marek Ferenc support the reverse chronology. Summing up the raid, M. Plewczyński states that it was the first expedition of this kind in the career of Krzysztof Radziwiłł; since then he had been considered "czołowy zagonczyk" [the leading reaver]⁹.

Obviously, the lack of detailed studies results from the poor source base. The main chronicler of the epoch Reinhold Heidenstein described the expedition in one sentence: "Krzysztof Radziwiłł invaded the enemy's land and ruined it up to Dorpat [Tartu]; next, in the same expedition he conquered Kierepeć and destroyed it" [trans. Agnieszka Chabros]¹⁰. Jan Zamoyski in his letter to Jerzy Radziwiłł also depicted the whole expedition very briefly. The grand crown chancellor informed that Krzysztof Radziwiłł "did much damage to his enemy; with his soldiers he conquered the enemy's land reaching Dorpat, which he ruined completely; he also conquered and burnt down the castle of Kierepeć; he captured many prisoners of war; he acquired a few cannons, much food and several other benefits; [during the expedition] a few thousand people and

⁷ M. FERENC, op.cit., pp. 574–575; P. ŁABĘDŹ, op.cit., pp. 36–37; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, op.cit., pp. 33–34; H. KOTARSKI, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie* [cz. 2], pp. 74–75; D. KUPISZ, op.cit., pp. 98–99.

⁸ P. ŁABĘDŹ, op.cit., pp. 36–37; M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, op.cit., pp. 33–34; H. KOTARSKI, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie* [cz. 2], pp. 74–75; D. KUPISZ, op.cit., pp. 98–99. Slightly different numbers are given by: H. LULEWICZ, *Radziwiłł Krzysztof*, pp. 264–276 ("over 2,000 horses"); M. FERENC, op.cit., p. 575 (1,950 soldiers).

⁹ M. PLEWCZYŃSKI, op.cit., p. 34.

¹⁰ Reinhold HEIDENSTEIN, *Dzieje Polski od śmierci Zygmunta Augusta do roku 1594*, trans. Michał GLISZCZAŃSKI, introduction Włodzimierz SPASOWICZ, t. 1–2, Petersburg 1857, here: t. 1, p. 303. Comp. Reinold HEIDENSTEIN, *De Bello Moscovitico Commentariorum*, Cracoviae 1584, p. 38.

a dozen thousand of cattle were captured” [trans. A.C.]¹¹. The description of the war actions of “Piorun” included in the anonymous *Res Moscoviticae* also includes the general information, providing the erroneous date of the expedition (1577)¹². Hieronim Rozdrażewski presented a similar record about the expedition of Krzysztof Radziwiłł and the defeat of Kiriempe¹³.

It should be noted that the expedition took place in the second half of February since as early as 14 February Krzysztof Radziwiłł sent from Kieś [Wenden] a letter to Stefan Batory¹⁴. The letter correlates with the king’s arrival in Grodno, where on 16–17 February there was held a meeting of senators, where the plan of Krzysztof Radziwiłł was approved of¹⁵. This makes it possible that the concentration of the Lithuanian forces did not take place somewhere in the vicinity of the Middle Daugava, but in Kieś – according to the original plan of Andrzej Sapieha. The date of the conquest of the castle of Kiriempe – 11 February – is also questionable.

My vision of this event was totally changed after I had got acquainted with the inconspicuous source – a small sheet of paper in „*Autografy Dubrowskiego*” in the National Library in Petersburg with the archival annotation “circa anno 1579”. In fact, it is the itinerary of the planned route of the army from Kieś [Wenden] to Dorpat. The preserved description of the routes is precious for two reasons. Firstly, it indicates that Krzysztof Radziwiłł, planning the offensive route, prepared three various options. Hypothetically, the itinerary may constitute the evidence of the army being divided into three independent regiments (the right one, the central one and the left one). All of them were to set off from Kieś, and the destination point was Dorpat. Secondly, it provides very precise distances (in miles) between towns and villages, which allows us to analyse the planned routes and check the precision of the itinerary¹⁶.

The itinerary provides the information about the distances in miles. However, it is not certain what units it meant. Undoubtedly, the contemporar-

¹¹ J. Zamoyski do J. Radziwiłła, Wilno 1 IV 1579 r., [in:] *Archiwum Jana Zamoyskiego kancлера i hetmana wielkiego koronnego*, t. 1: 1553–1579, ed. Waław SOBIESKI, Warszawa 1904, p. 307.

¹² Biblioteka Kórnicka, rkps. 1538, k. 1–1v.

¹³ H. Rozdrażewski do Hozjusza, Wilno 10 IV 1579 r., [in:] *Korespondencja Hieronima Rozdrażewskiego*, t. 1: 1567 – 2 VII 1582, ed. Paweł CZAPLEWSKI, Toruń 1937, p. 272. Probably Rozdrażewski described the whole expedition more thoroughly, but the letter was not preserved: H. Rozdrażewski do Bogurskiego, Wilno 1 V 1579 r., [in:] *ibid.*, p. 276.

¹⁴ K. Radziwiłł do Stefana Batorego, Wenden 14 II 1579 r., Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie [The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw], Archiwum Zamoyskich, rkps. 3112, pp. 8–10. H. Kotarski drew attention to this sources, see *idem*, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie* [cz. 2], p. 74, fn. 103.

¹⁵ P. ŁABĘDŹ, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

¹⁶ PHB, Ф. 971, АБТ. 321/1, № 9, k. 8.

ies counted miles in a practical manner – as a certain number of steps. This number, however, was not constant, and could amount to 4,000, 4,500 or even 5,000 double steps (*passus*), which constitutes correspondingly 6,277, 7,062 and 7,846 meters¹⁷. It should be assumed that before the era of detailed cartographic measurement a mile constituted the arbitrary value based on the subjective feeling¹⁸. The Radziwiłł map of Makowski from 1613 provides various values: *militaria magna* corresponded with 7,370 metres, *mediocria* – 6,336 metres, and *communia sive usitata* merely 5,560 metres¹⁹, so a mile corresponded to 10,000, 9,000 or 8,000 steps. My calculations of a mile recorded by Stanisław Pacholowiecki, who in 1579 made the map of the Duchy of Polotsk, indicate a mile was merely 5 kilometres, which means it was much smaller than the minor mile²⁰. On the other hand, Grzegorz Knapski in his work *The-saurus* (published for the first time in 1621) gave the definition of a mile based on the Cracow ells. Assuming that a Cracow ell was 59.5 cm, one mile should be equal to 7,933.33 meters²¹, which means more than one great mile.

The itinerary should allow us to define what Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” understood as a mile. Livonia was not *tierra incognita* – it was the area which still had many castles and towns connected with tracts between which trade

¹⁷ Stanisław SOLSKI, *Geometra polski to jest nauka rysowania, podziału, przemieniania y roz-mierzania linyi, angułów, figur i brył pełnych*, cz. 2, Kraków 1643, pp. 145–146. Comp. Gregorius KNAPIUSZ, *Thesaurus polono-latino-graecus seu promptuarium lingua Latinae et Graece [...]*, t. 1, Cracoviae 1643, p. 411; Edward STAMM, *Staropolskie miary*, cz. 1: *Miary długości i powierzchni*, Warszawa 1938, p. 32; Marek WREDE, *Itinerarium króla Stefana Batorego 1576–1586*, Warszawa 2010, pp. 41–42 (a mile is identified with 10,000 steps).

¹⁸ Witold KULA, *Miary i ludzie*, Warszawa 1970, passim (in particular pp. 11–12, 612–613). It should be underlined that it was not until the second half of the 16th century that engineers and cartographers started to use pedometer (*Schrittzähler*). See: Paul PFINZING, *Methodys Geometrica*, Nürnberg 1598, k. XLv; Helmut MINOW, *Historische Vermessungsinstrumente. Ein Ver-zeichniss der Sammlungen in Europa*, Wiesbaden 1990, pp. 201–202.

¹⁹ Stanisław ALEXANDROWICZ, *Mapa Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego Tomasza Makowskiego z 1613 r. tzw. „radziwiłłowska”, jako źródło do dziejów Litwy i Białorusi*, Studia Źródłoznawcze, t. 10: 1965, p. 39; Jarosław ŁUCZYŃSKI, *Przestrzeń Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego na mapie radziwiłłowskiej Tomasza Makowskiego z 1613 r. w świetle treści kartograficznej i opisowej*, ZH, t. 78: 2013, z. 1, p. 76. Por. D. [pseudonym – K.Ł.], *Wyjaśnienie: jaka była długość mili słusznej, używanej w r. 1669 w dzisiejszych zachodnich guberniach cesarstwa*, Biblioteka Warszawska, t. 2: 1854, pp. 582–585; Juliusz KOLBERG, *Porównanie miar i wag teraźniejszych i dawniejszych w Królestwie Polskiem używanych z zagranicznymi*, modified and developed by Wilhelm KOLBERG, Warszawa 1838, pp. 16–18.

²⁰ Karol ŁOPATECKI, *Okoliczności powstania i przydatność wojskowa „Descriptio ducatus Polocensis” Stanisława Pacholowieckiego (1580)*, Terminus, t. 19: 2017, z. 1, p. 119. The hitherto made calculations of S. Alexandrowicz (idem, *Kartografia Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego*, pp. 60–61) indicated that one mile was 5.6 km.

²¹ Comp. E. STAMM, op.cit., p. 33.

took place. The devastating expedition of the Muscovites of 1577 could not have caused the disappearance of those tracts.

Below I present three tables in which I analyse the route of the left, central and right regiments. Apart from the names of towns and villages and the distances recorded in the source, I also show the crow-fly distances. The last column shows the average length of a mile²².

Table 1. The planned route of the left-wing regiment

Fragment of the route of the left-wing regiment	Recorded distance	Crow-fly distance	Value of one mile
Kieś (Wenden) – Trikatski Przewóz (Trikāta)	6 miles	44.28 km	7.38 km
Trikatski Przewóz (Trikāta) – Rindoch (Rõngu/Ringen)	6 miles	70.65 km	11.77 km
Rindoch (Rõngu/Ringen) – Dorpat (Tartu)	6 miles	38.11 km	6.35 km

The left-wing regiment was to set off from Kieś (Wenden) to Trikatski Przewóz. The destination point should be identified with the village of Trikāta (German: Trikatzen, Polish: Trykat)²³. It is situated on the Abuls River [Abulīte], which constitutes the left tributary of the Gauja River (in the sources referred to as the Aa River). The river was the only essential setback during the expedition, which was connected not only with its width, but also with the depth of its course and high, rocky river banks²⁴. In fact, this stage of the journey was not connected with Trykat; I prolong the provided distance by 7 km and shorten the second stage by 7 km (which was recorded in the table). Next, the military units were to head for the castle of Rindoch [Rõngu/Ringen], the last stage of the journey being Dorpat [Tartu].

The expedition was planned to be divided into three equal parts – 6 miles each. In fact, the second stage of the journey was wrongly calculated as it was longer by 59.5% in comparison with the first stage, and 85.3% longer in comparison with the third stage. Perhaps this discrepancy resulted from the crossing of the Aa River, which was included in the total calculations.

If we average the whole route, 18 miles corresponded to 153.04 km, which means that a mile was merely 4% longer as from Kieś to Dorpat the crow-fly distance was 147.19 km.

²² All the tables based on the preserved itinerary [*itinerarium*]: PHB, Φ. 971, ABT. 321/1, № 9, k. 8.

²³ *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich*, t. 12, ed. Bronisław CHŁEBOWSKI, Warszawa 1892, p. 476.

²⁴ W. K. [Walery KOPERNICKI], *Rzeki i jeziora. Tekst objaśniający do mapy hydrograficznej dawnej Słowiańszczyzny części północno-zachodniej*, Warszawa 1883, p. 47; *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich*, t. 2, ed. Filip SULIMIEŃSKI, Bronisław CHŁEBOWSKI, Władysław WALEWSKI, Warszawa 1881, p. 500.

Table 2. The planned route of the central regiment

Fragment of the route of the central regiment	Recorded distance	Crow-fly distance	Value of one mile
Kieś (Wenden) – Trikatski Przewóz (Triķāta)	5 miles	37.28 km	7.45 km
Trikatski Przewóz (Triķāta) – Walek (Walk/Valga)	3 miles	32.26 km	10.75 km
Walek (Walk/Valga) – Sangnitz (Sangaste)	2 miles	24.23 km	12.11 km
Sangnitz (Sangaste) – Odepla (Odenpa/Otepää)	3 miles	17.64 km	5.88 km
Odepla (Odenpa/Otepää) – Dorpat (Tartu)	6 miles = 48 km	38.14 km	6.35 km

The central regiment was to cover the distance longer by one mile (19 miles) than the left-wing regiment. It is noticeable that it was much more carefully prepared than the plan of the left-wing regiment. The first part of the expedition should reach Trikatski Przewóz (Triķāta). However, different distance values were provided (5 and 6 miles), which means that from the beginning both regiments should travel separately, by different routes, and the crossing over the Gauja River might have taken place in distinct places. Next, the central regiment should head for the town of Walga [Walk/Valga]²⁵. The next halting place was the castle of Sangnitz [Sangaste, Schloss Sagnitz]. Half of this route was underestimated; a mile in the second and third fragment corresponded to 10.75 km and 12.11 km, while in the fourth stage one mile was 5.88 km. Fortunately, the remaining fragments – from Odepla [Odenpa, Otepää]²⁶ and Dorpat [Tartu] were relatively shorter. If the whole route had 149.55 km, it means that one mile corresponded to 7.87 km. It must be underlined that taking into account 5 stopovers, it did not prolong the whole route significantly – it was only longer by 2.38 km (1.6%).

Table 3. The planned route of the right-wing regiment

Fragment of the route of the right-wing regiment	Recorded distance	Crow-fly distance	Value of one mile
1	2	3	4
Kieś (Wenden) – Bebel (castle: Piebalgas pils, Pebalg; village: Vecpiebalga)	no data [6 miles]	43.13 km	— [7.18 km]
Bebel (Piebalgas pils, Pebalg) – Biržmujza (Birže Inflanckie, Bērzpils pagasts)	no data [6 miles]	80.86 km	— [13.47 km]
Biržmujza (Birže Inflanckie, Bērzpils pagasts) – Szwanbork (Gulbene, Schwanenburg)	no data [6 miles]	42.55 km	— [7.09 km]

²⁵ The village was granted the city rights from Stafen Batory five years later – in 1584, see: Roman CZAJA, *Miasta inflanckie i estońskie w XIII–XVI wieku*, [in:] *Inflanty w średniowieczu: władztwa zakonu krzyżackiego i biskupów*, ed. Marian BISKUP, Toruń 2002, p. 58.

²⁶ Armin TUULSE, *Die Burgen in Estland und Lettland*, Dorpat 1942, pp. 51–52.

1	2	3	4
Szwanbork (Gulbene, Schwanenburg) – Marienburg (Alüksne)	6 miles	33.05 km	5.05 km
Marienburg (Alüksne) – Kierepeć (Kirempe, Kirumpää)	6 miles	49.3 km	8.21 km
Kierepeć (Kirempe, Kirumpää) – Dorpat (Tartu)	6 miles	59.41 km	9.9 km

The right-wing regiment had a completely different route from the remaining two tracts described above. The first part of the route headed in a south-east direction, which did not lead to the castle and the town of Dorpat (see. Fig. 1). The military units were first to reach the castle of Bebel [Piebalgas pils, Pebalg]²⁷, next Biržmujza [Birze Inflanckie, Bērzpils pagasts]²⁸. It is possible that they wished to join the army of the Duchy of Courland and Semigalia, which may explain the choice of the route. The further tract led through the southeast borderlands of Livonia – through Szwanbork [Gulbene, Schwanenburg]²⁹, destroyed by the Russians in 1577, and Marienburg [Alüksne]³⁰. The route went deeply into the territories occupied in 1577 by the army of Ivan the Fearsome³¹. The itinerary also included the castle of Kirempe [Kierepeć], which was in the hands of the enemy. That is why, the itinerary reveals the intention to conquer the castle once the two remaining regiments had reached the vicinities of Tartu [Dorpat], which would make it impossible for the Russian army to send support to the attacked castle. The route also enabled the army to destroy and plunder a much bigger territory of the Russian borderland. It should be underlined that in the light of *Wiadomości kędy w ziemię nieprzyjacielską iść*³² [“The information which way to go to reach the enemy’s

²⁷ Andrzej RACHUBA, *Obraz działalności publicznej niełubianego bohatera. Uwagi w związku z pracą Arkadiusza Czwołka o Lwie Sapieże*, Kwartalnik Historyczny, R. 122: 2015, nr 2, p. 341. It is likely that the personnel of the castle was to be taken away. In the register of the Livonian army of 1579, prepared for Mikołaj and Krzysztof Radziwiłłs, the castle of “Bebel” was recorded, but the size of the unit stationed there was not provided, see: PHB, Ф. 971, АБТ. 321/1, № 10, k. 17. This is a much more detailed register than the one mentioned in the work: H. KOTARSKI, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie* [cz. 2], p. 118. See: Kasper NIESIECKI, *Herbarz Polski*, t. 3, ed. Jan N. BOBROWICZ, Lipsk 1839, p. 323.

²⁸ *Słownik geograficzny Królestwa Polskiego i innych krajów słowiańskich*, t. 1, ed. Filip SULMIERSKI, Bronisław CHLEBOWSKI, Władysław WALEWSKI, Warszawa 1880, pp. 232–233.

²⁹ *Baltisches historisches Ortslexikon*, hrsg. v. Hans FELDMANN, Heinz VON ZUR MÜHLEN, Teil 2: *Lettland (Südlivland und Kurland)*, bearb. v. Hans FELDMANN, Richard VON KYMMEL, Dagmar LYDIKE (†), Heinz VON ZUR MÜHLEN, Clara REDLICH, Sigrid WEIKERT-GIRGENSOHN (†), Köln–Wien 1990, pp. 566–567.

³⁰ A. TUULSE, op.cit., pp. 146–148.

³¹ P. ŁABĘDŹ, op.cit., pp. 29–36.

³² PHB, Ф. 971, АБТ. 321/1, № 2, k. 5–5v.




Fig. 1. The map of Livonia with the hydrological network and the itinerary of Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun”. On the map the following places are marked: 1. Kies, 2. Dopat, 3. Kirempo. The red line: the left-wing regiment route; the black line: the central regiment route; the blue line: the right-wing regiment route; the green line: the actual regiment route; the yellow line: the actual route of the withdrawal of all the Lithuanian forces from Dorpat [Tartu]. The data included in: PHB, *Op. 971, Abt. 321/1, № 9, 12*; marked on the map: *Ducatuum Livoniae et Curlandiae Nova Tabula*, Amsterdam [1705]

land” – trans. A.C.] of 1570 between Merienburg and Kirempa there existed a tract called “great highway”.

Unfortunately, the distances of the first stages of the expedition were not preserved. In this part of the journey the differences in the length of a mile are enormous and oscillate between 5.05 km to 9.9 km. The last three stages have 141.78 km and, if average the route, one mile here corresponds to 7.87 km. If we assume that all the six stages were equal and each of them was estimated to have 6 miles, then the crow-fly distance would be 308.3 km, while the average mile – 8.56 km.

Summing up, the average length of a mile in all the tracts is very similar and corresponds 8.5km – 7.87 km [or 8.56 km]. If we average the values, the mile used by Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” had as much as 8.07 km. It is a somewhat longer distance than the expected great mile. However, another phenomenon is worrying – very big differences in the length of a mile in individual fragments of the route from 5.05 km to 12.11 km. The second question is the huge difference in comparison with the map prepared by Stanisław Pacholowiecki in the same year, where one mile was 5 km.

Might the sources prepared for military purposes differ from each other so much in the same year (1579)? Obviously, we may assume that Krzysztof Radziwiłł provided distances in Lithuanian miles, which were much bigger and in the 17th century corresponded to 8,910 metres³³, while Pacholowiecki used the crown miles³⁴. To my way of thinking, the above mentioned calculations confirm the general conclusion that the value of one mile was not fixed and, to a large extent, was considered arbitrary and based on the subjective feeling. The difference in the distances of miles in the maps and itineraries might refer to the degree of difficulty in crossing a given area. According to the contemporaries, a mile remained the same (the distance covered in the identical period of time), but objectively the distance could be longer or shorter. This assumption means that moving into the territory of Polotsk Land and Vitebsk Land was very difficult, which is confirmed by the sources. Daniel Herman describes Polotsk Land in the following words: “a horrible road leads there; there is no worse road in the world. It seems to me that the main reason for this is the fact that since the Muscovites captured Polotsk in 1563, this tract has been completely impassable, all the connections cut off, and the land within the area of 20 miles far and wide from the side of the Daugava River has converted into a desert”³⁵ [trans. A.C.]. In the subsequent part of the account he stresses

³³ E. STAMM, *op.cit.*, p. 37.

³⁴ The thesis is very improbable. Pacholowiecki made his map without his own measurements, before the expedition to Polotsk. He used the existing itineraries, descriptions and maps of the Lithuanian provenance. See: K. ŁOPATECKI, *Okoliczności powstania*, pp. 116–117, 119.

³⁵ Translated by Agnieszka Chabros.

that “it is clear to see that both Hungarians and other soldiers marching in the front, had to search new tracts and make clearings in the forests to be able to get through”³⁶ [trans. A.C.]. Reinhold Heidenstein and Joachim Bielski³⁷ described the situation in the same way. Nevertheless, the condition of roads between Livonian towns and castles was (still) very good, which allowed the expedition to move quickly³⁸. The general description of the area prepared by Stanisław Herbst indicates that the territory was very diverse – along with well preserved roads and tracts there were also wetlands, primeval forests and rivers which were very hard to cross³⁹. Thus, it may be concluded that it was the diversified area that influenced the length of a mile as calculated in Tables 1–3.

Evaluating the itinerary, I declare that the drafts of the routes were made relatively carefully. One may easily notice that the left-wing route and the central route were practically parallel to each other (see Fig. 1). It ensured the possibility to cause more destructions during the completely coordinated actions. The analogy of those two routes is shown in Table 4. Both regiments should have reached Dorpat on the same day. On the other hand, the right-wing route was designed to be longer and independent. Only the preserved last three fragments were equal to the whole route of the left-wing regiment. To my mind, this route should have covered at least 36 miles. It is hard to believe that the advance soldiers were to undertake common actions with the remaining military units, but certainly they ruined the coordination of the Russian army. The military expedition deep into the Muscovite territory from the south could bring and brought expected results. The division of the army into three regiments was a strategical and operational move. It is possible that the right-wing regiment set off earlier than the remaining two.

Table 4. The comparison of the three routes Kieś–Dorpat

—	The left-wing route	The central route	The right-wing route
The planned route	18 miles	19 miles	36 (?) miles
The crow-fly distance	153.04 km	149.55 km	308.3 km

³⁶ *Relacja Daniela Hermana miasta Gdańska rajcy i sługi*, Wilno 9 X 1579 r., [in:] *Wiadomości do dziejów Polskich z Archiwum Prowincyi Szląskiej*, ed. August MOSBACH, Wrocław 1860, p. 161.

³⁷ Reinhold HEIDENSTEIN, *Dzieje Polski*, t. 1, p. 310; t. 2, pp. 12, 15; idem, *Pamiętniki wojny moskiewskiej w 6 księgach*, ed. and trans. Jan CZUBEK, Lwów 1894, p. 62; Marcin BIELSKI, *Kronika polska*, ed. Joachim BIELSKI, Kraków 1597, p. 760.

³⁸ Comp. Tomas ČELKIS, *Stan dróg lądowych i struktura systemu połączeń w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w końcu XV–XVII wieku*, ZH, t. 79: 2014, z. 3, pp. 39–60; Bożena WYROZUMSKA, *Drogi w ziemi krakowskiej do końca XVI wieku*, Wrocław 1970.

³⁹ Detailed description: Stanisław HERBST, *Wojna inflancka: 1600–1602*, Warszawa 1938, pp. 11–15.

Was it possible to use maps in the process of planning the three routes to Dorpat [Tartu]? At the beginning of the reign of Stefan Batory maps of Livonia existed – both printed and in manuscript versions⁴⁰. The letter of Peter Edling to Abraham Ortelius is worth mentioning. It was sent from Kołobrzeg on 15 August 1580. In the letter, Edling wrote that the Polish king Stefan Batory owned the atlas of Ortelius titled *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum* and used it⁴¹. The atlas included the faultless map of Joanne Portantion titled *Livoniae nova description*. The map of Livonia was also used during the Polish-Muscovite peace talks. During the negotiations the envoys wrote: “We inform that the land is divided from the side of Nowogródek, Kierepeć, Marienburg, Lucyn and Rzeżyca [...], as it may be read from the map presenting the Livonian castles which Your Grace [Jan Zamoyski] has given to Mr Harabuda. Additionally, the castle of Biały Kamień becomes the property of His Majesty King [Stefan Batory]” [trans. A.C.]⁴². Obviously, what they mean here is not the plans of the castles which would not contribute to international talks, but the location of the castles in the territory of Livonia. The copy of this map is preserved in the Vatican Archive; it is much more detailed than the printed map discussed above (see Fig. 2a and 2b)⁴³. Karol Buczek maintains that the manuscript of the map was created after Livonia had been taken over by the Muscovites and was probably known in 1577⁴⁴.

If we compare the itinerary with the map from the atlas of Ortelius, it turns out that the left-wing regiment and the central regiment change their positions (the central regiment becomes the left-wing regiment in the map). Moreover, the towns and villages marked on the route of the central regiment diverge from what the map says. However, if we compare the itinerary with the preserved manuscript map of Livonia, we obtain a very clear content. Naturally, it is not an irrefutable evidence indicating that Polish and Lithuanian commanders had manuscript maps of Livonia, which they used during the preparation of the itinerary of 1579. Undoubtedly, this hypothesis seems to be probable.

⁴⁰ For example, Tõnu RAID, *Raffaello Barberini teedekaart aastast 1564*, TUNA, vol. 11: 2008, issue 2, pp. 7–13, 17–20.

⁴¹ *Ecclesiae Londino-Batavae Archivvm*, t. 1: *Abrahami Ortelii [...] epistvlae*, ed. Jan Hendrik HESSELS, Cambridge 1887, p. 233: “Sicut regem Poloniae Stephanum intelligo nostro tempore plerumque Theatrum ante oculos habere”; S. ALEXANDROWICZ, *Kartografia Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego*, p. 59.

⁴² Posłowie polscy do J. Zamoyskiego, Jan Zapolski I I 1582 r., [in:] *Archiwum Jana Zamoyskiego kanclerza i hetmana wielkiego koronnego*, t. 2: 1580–1582, ed. Józef SIEMIEŃSKI, Warszawa 1909, p. 215.

⁴³ Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Segreteria di Stato, Germania, sygn. 93, k. 327.

⁴⁴ K. BUCZEK, *Dorobek kartograficzny wojen Stefana Batorego*, *Wiadomości Służby Geograficznej*, R. 8: 1934, z. 3, pp. 9–11.




Fig. 2. The plan of the expedition of the left-wing regiment (red colour), the central regiment (black colour) and the right-wing regiment (blue colour) put on the map of Johannes Portan-tius (the atlas of Abraham Ortelius) and its manuscript version from the turn of 1581 and 1582. See: <http://www.digar.ee/arhiiv/nlib-digar:977> (accessed July 12, 2017);

Karol BUZEK, *Dorobek kartograficzny wojen Stefana Batorego*,
Wiadomości Służby Geograficznej, R. 8: 1934, z. 3, tab. III

Luckily, we have not only the source which mentions the three routes of the planned offensive, but also *Droge ciagnienia Je[g]o M[iło]ści do Inflant, także miejsca w ziemie nieprzyjacielskiej za granicę ifliantską i plądrowania*⁴⁵ [“The march of His Grace to Livonia and the route of the march and looting the enemy’s land” – trans. A.C.]. I would like to underline that the route in 90% overlapped with the route of the central regiment (see the black and green lines in Fil. 1). The information included there is much more detailed. We find out that on 2 February “Piorun” was in Semigalia – in the town of Bowsk [Bauska]⁴⁶. Next, he set off to the most important Livonian fortress Dynemont [Dźwinoujście, Daugavgrīvas], where he arrived on 6 February⁴⁷. The next stage of the journey was the castle of Siguld [Germ. Segewold, Polish: Zygwold]. He reached the town on 12 February and stayed there for three days. The next stopping place was Kieś, where the army stationed on 15 and 16 February. The choice of the route preceding the expedition was not accidental; it was connected with the preparatory actions. Historians unanimously assume that the newly formed army consisted of all the units of the cavalry in Livonia. There were probably fewer of them than it had been expected as the exact register of the army made at that time indicates that Krzysztof Radziwiłł had 1812 cavalymen, the number of which he could increase by 140 horses belonging to infantry Rittmeisters. During the stay in the fortress of Dźwinoujście, the castle of Zygwold and in Kieś the infantry units were provided with more soldiers. As many as 1,030 drab soldiers – soldiers of the lowest rank – stationed in those three places⁴⁸. I think the commander-in-chief could have risked taking one-third of his staff, which would have been about 340 infantry soldiers. Radziwiłł got the military support from Duke Gotthard Kettler⁴⁹. How many soldiers could have been sent? In the autumn of 1579 Stefan Batory demanded that 300 soldiers be sent to take part in the future military actions. There took place an assembly of the landtag in Doben (7 October 1579), where it was established that the duke would provide 100 soldiers and noblemen would pay taxes in order to recruit 200 more soldiers. The military units of noblemen were to stay in the Duchy⁵⁰. If such forces were to be sent upon the former decision of the landtag, it does not seem possible that Krzysztof Radziwiłł should

⁴⁵ PHB, Φ. 971, ABT. 321/1, № 12, k. 21–21v.

⁴⁶ Mariusz BALCEREK, *Księstwo Kurlandii i Semigalii w wojnie Rzeczypospolitej ze Szwecją w latach 1600–1629*, Poznań 2012, pp. 45–48.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 50, 52–53.

⁴⁸ PHB, Φ. 971, ABT. 321/1, № 10, k. 16–17v.

⁴⁹ Karl H. VON BUSSE, *Herzog Magnus, König von Livland: ein fürstliches Lebensbild aus dem 16 Jahrhundert*, Leipzig 1871, p. 136; August SERAPHIM, *Die Geschichte des Herzogtums Kurland (1561–1795)*, Reval 1904, pp. 30–31.

⁵⁰ Archiv für die Geschichte Liv-, Est- und Curlands, Bd. 2, Dorpat 1843, pp. 226–230.

have acquired more than 150–200 soldiers (additionally with a few dozens of volunteers). The Livonian noblemen might have joined the expedition, but it cannot have been a significant quantity of soldiers (maximum several dozens of men) taking into account the urgency of the situation. Lithuanian Tatars also took part in the expedition. Probably there were over 150 of them; they were used to devastate the estates and capture prisoners of war⁵¹.

The only author who provides the exact size of the regiment of "Piorun" is a participant of the expedition Andrzej Rymsza, who in the poem *Dziesięćroczna powieść* writes:

Acz [Krzysztof Radziwiłł – K.Ł.]
nie miał jedno ośm set bojnych ludzi w kupie
A ku temu lancknechtow było z nim sto pieszych,
Falkonetow trzy było z trzemi działek mniejszych⁵².

The low numbers seemed quite unlikely. However, if we take into account the itinerary which allows the creation of three regiments, it turns out that we deal with the surprisingly consistent data revealing the power of the central regiment of Radziwiłł. In the drawing presenting the conquest of Kirempė (see Fig. 3) apart from the cavalry there appears the infantry (three rotas of soldiers) – both the national formation and the mercenaries (Landsknechts) along with two siege cannons, which overlaps with the account of Rymsza⁵³. To my mind, all the forces of Krzysztof Radziwiłł included about 2,200 cavalymen, about 400 infantrymen and a few cannons. Taking into account the fact that it was a plundering expedition⁵⁴, there must have been several dozens of carts. It was not a typical horse cavalry since it moved quite slowly (see more in the subsequent parts of the article).

The route went from Kieś (16 February) to Burhartowa Mojza (18 February), Trikatski Przewóz (19 February), Wałk (20 February) three miles of Odtepla (21 February), next one mile and a half of Odtepla (23 February); the camp was set up in a small village of Karuga situated 2 miles of Dorpat (24 February). The military expedition lasted eight days and covered the distance of 16 miles (172 kilometres). The daily average of the march was 21.5 kilometres

⁵¹ PHБ, Ф. 971, АБТ. 321/1, № 21, к. 57–58v; comp. Henryk WISNER, *Rzeczypospolita Warszów*, t. 2: *Wojsko Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, dyplomacja, varia*, Warszawa 2004, p. 173.

⁵² "[Krzysztof Radziwiłł] had only 800 soldiers gathered in his regiment // additionally, 100 infantrymen – landknechts accompanied him, // he also had three falconets and three smaller cannons" [trans. A.C.]. Andrzej RYMSZA, *Deketeros akroama to jest dziesięćroczna powieść wojennych spraw [...] Krzysztofa Radziwiłła*, [in:] W. R. RZEPKA, A. SAJKOWSKI, op.cit., p. 151.

⁵³ Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie, nr inw. 16596 A*.

⁵⁴ J. Zamoyski do J. Radziwiłła, Wilno 1 IV 1579 r., [in:] *Archiwum Jana Zamoyskiego*, t. 1, p. 307.

a day (2.7 miles). It must be underlined that the itinerary was closely observed – there were few deviations from the plan. Krzysztof Radziwiłł set off with his regiment through the central route – the reference points were Burhartowa Mojza, Trikatski Przewóz, Wałk. In the second part of the expedition more freedom of decision may be observed. Still the most important place was Odtepla, but the castle of Sangnitz was not recorded. The camp was established in the village of Karuga situated 16 kilometres of the towns – not near the city walls of Dorpat. From 24 to 27 February the army slept in the camp set up in this place and plundered the adjacent territories⁵⁵. The way back from Kirempe to Dorpat was covered in seven days, which gives us the average daily speed of 21.6 km, which is identical with the speed of the expedition on its way to Dorpat⁵⁶. Carrying booty did not make the expedition move more slowly; it amounted to 2.7 miles in both directions. The data should be juxtaposed with the calculations of Marek Wreda concerning the movement of the court of Stefan Batory. According to this scholar, the king, travelling only with his court, moved with the speed of 30–35 km a day. However, the army marched more slowly – with the pace of ca. 2 miles (the author identifies a mile with 7 km), which made 14 km⁵⁷. Thus, we may consider the pace of Krzysztof Radziwiłł's expedition to be quite quick, but not strenuous.

There appears one more important question – how the weather affected the speed of the march and the success of the expedition. The research hitherto conducted indicates that during the expedition, the average temperature in the winter (December–February) was 2°C lower, while in summers were much warmer than now⁵⁸. It should also be added that in the 21st century the average temperature in Dorpat in February is -7.1°C, and in March -2.6°C⁵⁹. Svetlana Jevrejeva analysed the freezing and thawing of the port in Riga in the years 1529–1990. According to her, the winter of 1578–1579 was aver-

⁵⁵ *Postępki sławy wiecznej godne wojenne [...] Krzysztopha Radziwiłła*, PHB, Ф. 971, АВТ. 321/1, № 143, k. 48: “z kilkiem tysięcy ludzi wielką część ziemie Inflantskiej, która była w possejsji kniazia Wielkiego Moskiewskiego splundrował”. The author also gives a piece of information that has not been confirmed that “Derpt miasto spalił”. See: *Spisanie niektórej części pomieszcij bojarskich okolic Derptu popalonych po 29 in Februario et Marcio*, PHB, Ф. 971, АВТ. 152, № 6, k. 17–17v.

⁵⁶ The length of the route was calculated on the basis of the methodology used in the article. The average calculated distance in a car is 159.6 km, on foot 143.6 km. The average value is 151.6 km.

⁵⁷ M. WREDA, op.cit., p. 42.

⁵⁸ Rajmund PRZYBYŁAK, Gabriel WÓJCIK, Kazimierz MARCINIAK, Waldemar CHORAŻY-CZEWSKI, Wiesław NOWOSAD, Piotr OLIŃSKI, Krzysztof SYTA, *Zmienność warunków termiczno-opadowych w Polsce w okresie 1501–1840 w świetle danych historycznych*, Przegląd Geograficzny, t. 76: 2004, z. 1, pp. 18–20.

⁵⁹ <https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Климат> (accessed 9 July 2017).

age, which meant that the ice melted the port of Riga on 6 April (the data from the 18th–20th centuries)⁶⁰. To my mind, it was not low temperatures that constituted an obstacle, but the hydrological conditions. Undoubtedly, it was extremely difficult to move in Livonia in the early spring. The melting of snow, the rising level of water in rivers and streams along with floodings made any military action impossible to carry out in view of the technical and road conditions of the time. The contemporaries were perfectly aware of this fact. That is why they decided to commence the expedition in the late winter – it was an ideal time to send advance soldiers. It provided quite good (and stable) communication conditions, but, on the other hand, it made it impossible for the opposite party to launch a counteroffensive due to the upcoming spring.

If we assume that in 1579 three regiments acted in a coordinated way, the question appears who and in what circumstances conquered the castle of Kirempe [Kierepeć]. It was the destination point of the right-wing regiment. The sources which have been hitherto analysed, prove that the winner of the expedition was Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Piorun". The campaign of 1579, crowned with the conquest of Kirempe, was used in the propaganda of the Radziwiłł family⁶¹. Jan Kochanowski was one of the poets who wrote about Krzysztof Radziwiłł's seizure of the castle in the poem *Jezda do Moskwy*, published in 1583⁶²:

[...] takim cię Inflanty
W tym czasie oglądały i moskiewskie kąty,
Gdzieś Derptowi w nos kurzył, Kierepeć wyrócił,
Liczbę nieprzeliczoną wsi w popiół obrócił,
Więźniów zacnych nawiązał, niesłychaną plonu
Moc wypędził, sam cało wrócił się do domu⁶³.

Andrzej Rymśza describes the triumph of "Piorun" in *Dziesięcioroczna powieść wojennych spraw* written in 1585:

⁶⁰ Svetlana JEVREJEVA, *Severity of winter seasons in the northern Baltic Sea between 1529 and 1990: reconstruction and analysis*, Climate Research, vol. 17: 2001, pp. 55–62.

⁶¹ However, we must remember about the "information noise" appearing in the works and presenting events which were not historical facts: Roman KRZYWY, „Chcesz być groźnym, a uciekasz...”. *Nad komentarzem do epinikionów moskiewskich Jana Kochanowskiego*, Pamiętnik Literacki, t. 104: 2013, z. 3, pp. 185–193.

⁶² See: Stanisław ŁEMPICKI, *Wiek złoty i czasy romantyzmu w Polsce*, Warszawa 1992, pp. 478–479, 491.

⁶³ "Thus Livonia // at that time watched the Muscovite lands, // When you were burning down the territories of Dorpat and destroying Kierepeć, // A great deal of villages were burnt down, // you captured important enemies and many prisoners of war // you took them, and you came back safely home" [trans. A.C.]; Jan KOCHANOWSKI, *Dzieła polskie*, introduction and footnotes by Julian KRZYŻANOWSKI, t. 3, Warszawa 1953, p. 160.

Mało na tym, że Moskwę aż k Derptu prowadził,
 Jeszcze ku kierepecki zamek barzo wadził.
 Zamek dobrze obronny i ludem, i strzelbą,
 Siła rzekło, iż tego muru nie dobędą,
 Bo strzelby znaku z sobą nie nabrał do tego.
 Mężne serce radziło przedsięwzięciu jego,
 Aby pierwiej doświadczył męstwa derpetskiego,
 Potym łącno spróbować i kierepetskiego.
 Wiedział bowiem, iż tam lud zawsze był świeży,
 Żywność także wszec zamkow tam liflanskich leży⁶⁴.

Droga ciągnięcia Je[g]o M[iło]ści do Inflant confirms the description of Andrzej Rymsza. Suddenly, on 28 February the camp of Dorpat was struck and the regiment headed for Kirempe. After three days, the prince reached the castle (the daily pace was about 23.3 km). The decision was unplanned in the itinerary; it must have resulted from the information received from the right-wing regiment. According to Andrzej Rymsza, the lack of heavy artillery allowed the Russians to defend the castle. Radziwiłł decided to take the castle by storm. That is why he persuaded the cavalry to leave their horses and launch an attack, which ended successfully. Nevertheless, the author, incidentally, records that among the Lithuanians there were also Germans (people from Courland?):

Niosą łupy bogate jak Niemcy tak naszy,
 Jeden dziesięć Moskalow samym wzrokiem straszny.
 Potym wiodą wojewod w postawie pokornej,
 Już im nie stało fukow ani mowy górnej.
 Hetman, pan miłosierny, przyjął ich do siebie⁶⁵.

The Radziwiłł family not only propagated the triumph of “Piorun” of 1579 in poems, but also a picture commemorating this event, painted in the second half of the 18th century, was commissioned by King Stanisław August Poniatowski (see Fig. 3)⁶⁶. It includes a verse inscription, which I enclose below transcribed and translated by Grzegorz Franczak⁶⁷.

Christophorus Radivil Campi Dux caede cruenta
 Derpato adjunctos igneque vastat agros:

⁶⁴ A. RYMSZA, op.cit., pp. 150–151, w. 159–168.

⁶⁵ “The Germans and ourselves, we carry plundered goods // One soldier of ours intimates ten Russians with the way he looks at them. // Then, they lead the voivodes who are walking humbly, // They are no longer impudent and brave. // Hetman mercifully has taken them under his care” [trans. A.C.]; ibid., pp. 151–152, w. 193–197.

⁶⁶ M. JANICKI, op.cit., pp. 212–221.

⁶⁷ Comp. T. ŻEBRAWSKI, op.cit., p. 53, nr 8.

Diffugiunt Moschi capiturque arx firma Kerepet,
 Machinae et insignes multaque praeda simul.
 Vincla Palatinus Stephanus Visoslauscius atque
 Ostalec Ominow tum subiere duo.
 Plescoviam usque tenus populatus et omnia Vilnam
 Ad Stephanum regem victor ovansque redit⁶⁸.

The above inscription overlaps with the information provided by Rymsza, but the collapse of the castle was here indirectly associated with Krzysztof Radziwiłł. The poem records the conquest of the castle and capturing two Russian voivodes along with the fact of plundering extensive areas near Dorpat and Kirempe up to Pskov⁶⁹. Obviously, the last piece of information is somewhat exaggerated. The conquered castle was situated 80 km of the Russian town as the crow flies⁷⁰. Taking into account the pace of the march, advance soldiers would cover no more than 25 km a day⁷¹.

The drawing presents the burning of the conquered castle of Kirempe (Fig. 3)⁷². The event was described in a poetic form by Franciszek Gradowski in *Hodoeporicon Moschicum* – "Tu Ceropecion flammis crepitantibus amplum // Incendens, Stygias tot millia multa sub umbras // Misisti, mediis victor generosus in armis"⁷³. The decision of Krzysztof Radziwiłł to destroy the fortress seems to be right. The maintenance of the castle seemed to be impossible; what

⁶⁸ "Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the field hetman conquers the Dorpat land in a bloody war burning down the whole territory: // the Muscovites run away, the stronghold of Kierepeć surrenders, // the cannons and other plundered goods become the property of the conqueror. // Stefan Wysołowcow was shackled // along with him Ostalec and Ominow, two Muscovite voivodes. // Once he had looted the whole country down to Pskov, // he returned to King Stefan to Vilnius in the victorious glory" [trans. A.C.]; (Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie, nr inw. 16594 A*).

⁶⁹ During the conquest of Kirempe, over 60 people were killed, including the starost Ivan Kropotov. The voivode Stefan Wysołowcow with his wife, children and 16 servants were captured; as were Ostalec Michajłowicz Omianow with his wife, brother, children and 17 servants. PHB, Φ. 971, ABT. 152, № 21, k. 58–58v.

⁷⁰ Dariusz Kupisz (op.cit., p. 98) and Piotr Łabędz (op.cit., p. 37) estimate the distance at 60 km.

⁷¹ Groups of advance soldiers were sent from Dorpat. One reached the border dividing Livonia from the Muscovite Empire. It probably finished at Peipus Lake and Pskov Lake. The other, consisting of Tatar soldiers, would have covered 10 miles. This expedition could not have reached Pskov (situated 138 km of Dorpat), either. PHB, Φ. 971, ABT. 321/1, № 21, k. 57–57v.

⁷² J. Zamoyski do J. Radziwiłła, Wilno 1 IV 1579 r., [in:] *Archiwum Jana Zamoyskiego*, t. 1, p. 307; R. HEIDENSTEIN, *Dzieje Polski*, t. 1, p. 303; R. HEIDENSTEIN, *De Bello Moscovitico*, p. 38.

⁷³ Franciszek GRADOWSKI, *Hodoeporicon Moschicum*, Wilno 1582, w. 765–767: "Ty rozległy Kierepeć zapalając huczny płomieniem, tyle tysięcy ludzi posłałeś do stygijskich cieniów, sam świetny zwycięzca stojąc w ogniu walk"; S. ŁEMPICKI, op.cit., p. 491. Cf. Franciszek GRADOWSKI, *Hodoeporicon Moschicum. Wyprawa moskiewska*, ed. Bartłomiej CZARSKI, trans. Bartłomiej CZARSKI, Ariadna MASŁOWSKA-NOWAK, Warszawa 2011, pp. 72–73.

is more, from the Russian perspective it was an important fortress constituting the entrance to Pskov from the side of Livonia, while the Lithuanian forces were too weak to defend the castle⁷⁴.



Fig. 3. The destruction of the castle of Kirempa [Kierepeć]⁷⁵,
Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie, nr inw. 16594A*

The careful analyses of the drawing shows a very surprising element. Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun” triumphantly approaches Kirempa. At the same time, the picture shows the firing of the fortress and the defence of the burning castle. I think we deal here with the simultaneous presentation of the conquest of the castle and the triumphant entrance of Radziwiłł. His person is shown on a horse – the commander is wearing armour, commands the regiment and is

⁷⁴ During the negotiations at the end of 1581 and at the beginning of 1582, the Russians tried (without success) to acquire the castle as the only one that would be given to them in Livonia. See: Posłowie polscy do J. Zamoyskiego, Jam Zapolski 23 XII 1581 r., [in:] *Archiwum Jana Zamoyskiego*, t. 2, pp. 156–157; Posłowie polscy do J. Zamoyskiego, Jam Zapolski 25 XII 1581 r., [in:] *ibid.*, pp. 167.

⁷⁵ Unfortunately, we do not have plans or the picture of the castle from the time prior to its being burnt. We only have pictures of the castle restored later by the Swedes. The layout of the castle might have differed, but it must have had a huge roundel put forward in front of the face of the wall. Both the available 17th century plans and the drawing of the ruins of the castle of 1801 do not leave any doubt in relation to the correct identification of the castle presented in Fig. 3. See: Krigsarkivet, 0406 (Utländska stads- och fästningsplaner 1550–1989), 28 (Östersjöprovinserna), 20 (Kirjupä), nr 2; Johann Christoph Brotze, *Sammlung verschiedener Liefländischer Monumete*, Latvijas Akadēmiskās bibliotēkas Johana Kristofa Broces kolekcija, t. IX, k. 12v.

seated on an galloping horse, which is about to jump⁷⁶. The approaching cavalry units are holding a banner with an eagle with stretched wings (probably it was a black eagle, which was granted to the Radziwiłłs along with the dukedom by Charles V in 1547⁷⁷); the hetman is followed by a blustering cavalrman with a pennant or the hetman's flag⁷⁸. The hetman is welcomed by infantrymen – dressed like landsknechts and drab soldiers (national mercenaries). Soldiers are forming a guard of honour, lifting their arquebuses and saluting the hetman. Next to the military unit there is a standard-bearer with a banner and a musician playing the drum. In the background, the picture presents horsemen, who are burning the adjacent buildings, and escaping people.

The iconographic source does not constitute a sufficient evidence. The Livonian written sources inform that the castle of Kirempe in 1579 was not conquered by Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Piorun". The victory was attributed to oberst (colonel) Jurgen Buttler, who set off from Riga and – heading for Dorpat – conquered Kirempe, where he captured many prisoners and burnt the castle down. This situation is described by Balthasar Russow, the 16th century Livonian chronicler living in Reval. In his account he fails to mention "Piorun"⁷⁹. Konstanty Górski mentioned "Piorun" as the commander of the conquest, but this source fell into oblivion in the Polish historiography⁸⁰.

The 17th century Livonian (Swedish) chronicler Thomas Hiärne (1638–1678) describes the event with more details. According to him, Krzysztof Radziwiłł set off from Wenden commanding 1,000 Polish, Lithuanian and Tatar cavalrymen along with 1,000 Livonian and Courish cavalrymen from Dorpat. Next, it was recorded that the commander of the military group which had conquered Kirempe and burnt the castle was the Courish oberst Jurgen But-

⁷⁶ Mieczysław MORKA, *Polski nowożytny portret konny i jego europejska geneza*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków–Gdańsk–Łódź 1986. About the images of magnates on horses see *ibid.*, pp. 165–176.

⁷⁷ Sławomir GÓRZYŃSKI, Jolanta GRAŁA, Włodzimierz PIWKOWSKI, Violetta URBANIAK, Teresa ZIELIŃSKA, *Radziwiłłowie herbu Trąby*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 46–47.

⁷⁸ Karol ŁOPATECKI, *Znak hetmański: geneza, funkcje, symbolika*, Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości, t. 42: 2006, pp. 59–93.

⁷⁹ Balthasar Rüssow, *Livländische Chronik*, Aus dem Plattdeutschen übertragen u. mit kurzen Anmerkungen versehen durch Eduard PABST, Reval 1845, p. 272: "Kiriempe verbrannt, 1579. Auf dasselbige Mal ist Jürgen Butler auch mit den Curischen und Stiftischen von Riga in's Stift Dörpte gefallen und hat das Häuslein Kiriempe gestürmt, etliche Russen darauf erschlagen und dasselbige Haus in den Grund verbrannt"; *idem*, *Chronica. Der Provintz Lyfflandt, darinnne vermeldet werdt [...]*, [b.m.w.] 1584, p. 117; Friedrich Georg VON FIRCKS, *Ueber den Ursprung des Adels in den Ostsee-Provinzen Russlands und das den alten Rittergeschlechtern daselbst gebührende Prädicat Freiherr*, Mitau–Leipzig 1843, p. 148; A. SERAPHIM, *op.cit.*, pp. 30–31; Constan-tin METTIG, *Baltische Städte: Skizzen aus der livländischen Geschichte*, Riga 1901, p. 9.

⁸⁰ Konstanty GÓRSKI, *Pierwsza wojna Rzeczypospolitej z Wielkiem Księstwem Moskiewskiem za Batorego*, Biblioteka Warszawska, t. 4: 1892, p. 108.

bler⁸¹. Some sources say that it was Magnus of Livonia (1540–1583) that conquered Kirempa – the error results from the fact that he took over the castle in 1581, which we find out from the chronicle of Dionysius Fabricius⁸².

Obviously, the Livonian-Courish military effort described by Thomas Hiärne is improbable. However, let me underline that the estimation of all the powers taking place in the expedition (2,000 people) is credible; moreover, the size of the central regiment of Krzysztof Radziwiłł (1,000 people) coincides with the information provided by Andrzej Rymsza. German sources and studies indicate that it was the colonel of the Courish Duke Jurgen Buttler that conquered Kirempa. The sources show the military expedition which set off from Riga (Krzysztof Radziwiłł stayed in Dźwinoujście) and was to reach Dorpat. Comparing the data with the itinerary, I think that actually during the expedition the army was divided into three regiments. The left-wing regiment and the central regiment could be treated as one unit since their route was simultaneous and they were commanded by Krzysztof Radziwiłł “Piorun”. On the other hand, the right-wing regiment was commanded by the Courish oberst Jurgen Buttler, who is assumed to have reached Kirempa.

How the castle was conquered I do not know. There are two probable but contradictory accounts. Kirempa might have been conquered by the regiment of Buttler, but it is equally probable that it only commenced the siege, after which Radziwiłł was asked to help. The fragment of the route from Dorpat to Kirempa was not included in the itinerary. The Duke might have modified the route having been informed about the conquest of the castle and the need to make a decision what to do with it. This solution seems to be more probable. However, Andrzej Rymsza presented a more spectacular and romantic narrative – Radziwiłł’s speech, the haste of the cavalry and the attack on the castle:

Kazał swemu rycerstwu zsiadać z kopijami,
Mówiąc: „A ja sam zaraz tuż pojđę przed wami,
Pojđę przy was cnych ludziech, zdrowia nie żałując
Pojđę, wam te potrawy wiernie kredencując”.
Wnet wsze zacne rycerstwo hetmanowi swemu
Dzięki dawszy, pośpieszno szli ku zamku temu
Mężnym sercem, aż krzyk ich niebo usłyszało;
Echo milczeć musiała, głosu jej nie stało⁸³.

⁸¹ Thomas HIÄRN, *Ehst-, Lyf- und Lettlaendische Geschichte*, hrsg. v. Carl Eduard von NAPIERSKY, Riga–Dorpat–Leipzig 1835, p. 323. See: K. H. von BUSSE, op.cit., p. 136.

⁸² Dionysius FABRICIUS, *Livoniae Historiae Compendiosa Series*, cur. Gustav BERGMANN, [in:] *Drey kleine Schriften über die Geschichte Livland’s*, Riga 1857, p. 115; Andres ADAMSON, *Hertsog Magnus: 1540–1583: tema elu ja aeg*, [Tallinn] 2005, p. 175.

⁸³ “He made the knights go down from his horses // Saying: ‘I will go first to attack, // I will accompany you – brave people, I shall not spare my health // I shall go with you to taste this

It is probable that in the future, sources will allow scholars to solve the problem. Undoubtedly, the conquest of the castle must have been associated with the haste of the cavalry as there were too few infantrymen⁸⁴.

* * *

The above analysis indicates that it is necessary to consider thoroughly time and space in order to evaluate the military actions (in a strategic and operational sense). The scholars' findings concerning the average daily pace of the march during individual military actions and the confrontation of the data allow us to acquire additional knowledge and to evaluate the military campaigns conducted then. We must also take into account the time of the expedition and compare it with the climatic features of the territory where the army operated. It seems indispensable to use the research on the changes of the climate and the so called Little Ice Age⁸⁵.

1. At the beginning of 1579 Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Piorun" designed an expedition to Kieś near Dorpat on the basis of the concept of Andrzej Sapieha. However, it was not a copied project. To my mind, it was a new and quite innovative idea. Three routes were prepared. Two northern routes (the left-wing route and the central route) ran close to each other in a parallel manner, while the third one (the right-wing route) differed completely from the first two since it went deep into the Russian lands from backwards (see Fig. 1). To my way of thinking, the project to divide the army into three regiments and to coordinate the military actions by means of the itinerary was carried out successfully. We know the exact route of Krzysztof Radziwiłł's expedition, which in 90 % overlaps with the central route. Livonian chronicles indicate the Courish oberst Jurgen Buttler to be the conqueror of the castle of Kirempe, which seems to be confirmed by the drawing of the conquest of the castle. Probably, he was the commander of the left-wing regiment. Unfortunately, I am not in

dish.» // Then all the brave knights // thanking their hetman, willingly attacked the castle // with brave hearts and screams that reached the sky" [trans. A.C.]; A. RYMSZA, op.cit., p. 151, w. 181–188.

⁸⁴ At that time hussars should have been equipped with firearms. For example, Mikołaj Mielecki was to prepare the army in Dżisna in 1579 "y tak ieżdzie iako piechocie strzłbe reczna wypuścić kazał, bo kromia kopijey, szable, y koncerza, każdy iezdny miał rusznice przy koniu", see: M. BIELSKI, op.cit., p. 761.

⁸⁵ See: Ulf BÜNTGEN, Tomáš KYNCL, Christian GINZLER, David S. JACKS, Jan ESPER, Willy TEGEL, Karl-Uwe HEUSSNER, Josef KYNCL, *Filling the Eastern European gap in millennium-long temperature reconstructions*, Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States, vol. 110: 2013, no. 5, pp. 1773–1778 (and attached annex); John HALDON, Lee MORDECHAI, Timothy P. NEWFIELD, Arlen F. CHASE, Adam IZDEBSKI, Piotr GUZOWSKI, Inga LABUHN, Neil ROBERTS, *History meets palaeoscience: Consilience and collaboration in studying past societal responses to environmental change*, *ibid.*, vol. 115: 2017, <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1716912115> (accessed March 19, 2018).

a position to verify whether the left-wing regiment was isolated and who commanded the right-wing regiment.

2. The analysis of the itinerary prepared by Krzysztof Radziwiłł in 1579 indicates that one mile should be counted as ca. 8 km. In the map of Polotsk Land, made in the same year by Stanisław Pachołowiecki, one mile corresponds with merely 5 km. The differences might have resulted from distinct measurement units (the small and great mile). However, it is more likely that a mile was at that time a subjective measurement unit which depended on the quality of roads. The bad quality of roads in Polotsk Land (or the lack of them) affected the length of a mile. On the other hand, the quality of Livonian roads was good, sometimes even very good. It should be added that the late winter created very good land communication conditions (compacted snow, marked routes – with the average temperature 2°C lower than nowadays). The time of the expedition was not accidental (16 February – 6 March) as it was ideal for the plundering attack. Owing to the upcoming thaws, the enemy could not launch a counteroffensive, which guaranteed a safe return to Kieś and a lack of Muscovite military units sent from Dorpat.

3. The average daily pace of the expedition Kieś–Dorpat–Kieś was 21.55 km, which corresponded to 2.7 miles (a mile counted as 8 km). The speed of the march could not have been “lightning fast”, but it went smoothly. Unfortunately, there is no research concerning the speed of the expedition. However, we know that great armies of Stefan Batory from the years 1579–1582 moved more slowly – with the average velocity of 14 km a day. Yet, those armies had to go through much more difficult tracks than in Livonia. Undoubtedly, the problem of the velocity of military units constitutes one of the most desirable research issues for military, political and economic reasons. Contemporaries estimated that the Roman army moved with the daily speed of 29,600 meters⁸⁶, but it must be remembered that the movement took place on Roman roads.

4. The cartographic analysis shows that during the works on the itinerary maps were probably used. However, they could not have been printed cartographic sources, but manuscripts. Obviously, the knowledge and experience of the people familiar with the province were still the most crucial, but it seems indispensable to use cartographic sources for the spatial visualization.

5. The effort of soldiers and horses and the length of the covered distance must be underlined. In the light of the itinerary, the left-wing route amounted to 184.96 km, the central route – 178.63 km, while the right-wing route was much longer – 381.33 km. If we take into account that the first two

⁸⁶ Marcin BIELSKI, *Sprawa Rycerska według postępku y zachowania starego obyczaju Rzymskiego, Greckiego, Macedońskiego y innych Narodow pierwszej y niniejszego Wieku tak Pogańska iako y Krześcijańska z rozmaitych Ksiąg wypisana ku czytaniu y Nauce Ludidziom Rycerskim pożyteczna*, Kraków 1569, k. 6v, 10.

regiments from Dorpat went to Kirempe, the left-wing regiment finished its route according to the plan – then we get the following distances: 254.81 km, 248.48 km and 311.48 km. On average Lithuanian soldiers during the winter campaign of 1579 covered over 500 km. The army was not tired, horses were not injured or exhausted if instead of stationing near the Daugava River, soldiers lawlessly went to Vilnius in order to get their pay. It means that they covered additional 300 km⁸⁷. The state of roads, climatic conditions and the route itself must have been good for soldiers and did not affect adversely the offensive abilities of the military units⁸⁸.

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THE MILITARY EXPEDITION OF KRZYSZTOF RADZIWIŁŁ “PIORUN” TO LIVONIA IN THE WINTER OF 1579

Summary

Key words: *itinerarium*, military cartography, Kierepeć [Kirempe], Dorpat [Tartu], Livonia in the 15th century

The article presents the Lithuanian expedition carried out in Livonia in the winter of 1579. On the basis of the itinerary [*itinerarium*] and iconographic and written sources it has been established that three regiments were to act in a coordinated manner to conduct the military action against the Russian Empire. All the three regiments were to set off from Kieś [Wenden] and through different ways reach Dorpat [Tartu] occupied by the Russians. The whole expedition included about 200 cavalry soldiers

⁸⁷ P. ŁABĘDŹ, *op.cit.*, p. 37

⁸⁸ For the sake of comparison, when the advance soldiers sent from the Mitau [Jelgava] River to the vicinities of Kokenhaussen at the end of November 1621 – about 70% of horses were injured [“grudą pochromione”] owing to the bad condition of roads; comp.: *Rejestr wojska zdolnego do boju z pułku Aleksandra Gosiewskiego*, [in:] Jan KUNOWSKI, *Ekspedycja inflantska 1621 roku*, ed. by Wojciech WALCZAK, Karol ŁOPATECKI, Białystok 2007, p. 178.

and about 400 common infantry soldiers [Polish: drab] along with several light artillery and a numerous lager. Owing to the activities undertaken by the three regiments, destructions were much more extensive, more loot was acquired and military successes were more significant – the castle of Kierepeć was conquered. The activity of three separate regiments confused the enemy and prevented them from undertaking the effective defence. The expedition was carried out from 16 February to 6 March, which also affected its outcome. The late winter provided the best conditions for the land communication, while the upcoming thaw made it impossible for the enemy to launch the counter-defence. It resulted in the safe return to Kieś and a lack of Moscovite units sent from Dorpat. To my way of thinking, the winter expedition of 1579 to Livonia was the best example of the manoeuvre art of the Polish-Lithuanian army in the 16th century.

The routes of two regiments (the left one and the central one) ran close to each other, while the third one (the right one) had a totally different route entering the Russian lands from the back. The right regiment was commanded by the Oberst [Colonel] of Courland Junger Buttler, who conquered the castle of Kierepeć [Kirempė]. The main unit was commanded by Krzysztof Radziwiłł nicknamed “Perkūnas”, who plundered the vicinities of Dorpat. The analysis of the itinerary of 1579 prepared by Krzysztof Radziwiłł indicates that the mile recorded there corresponded to 8 kilometres. The average daily velocity of the expedition Kieś–Dorpat–Kieś amounted to 21.55 km, which corresponded to 2.7 miles. During the expedition the regiments covered from 250 to 310 km, which along with the return journey amounted to 500 km.

DER FELDZUG VON KRZYSZTOF RADZIWIŁŁ “PIORUN” IN LIVLAND
IM WINTER 1579

Zusammenfassung

Schlüsselwörter: *itinerarium*, Militärkartografie, Kirempė, Dorpat, Livland im 16. Jahrhundert

Der Artikel handelt vom litauischen Feldzug in Livland im Winter 1579. Auf der Grundlage eines wiederaufgefundenen *itinerarium* sowie von ikonografischen und schriftlichen Quellen konnte ermittelt werden, dass damals drei Regimenter gebildet wurden, die in koordinierter Weise eine Militäraktion gegen das russische Zarenreich durchführen sollten. Alle sollten aus Wenden aufbrechen und auf verschiedenen Wegen in das von den Russen besetzte Dorpat gelangen. Am gesamten Feldzug nahmen etwa 2000 berittene Soldaten und etwa 400 Schützen teil, dazu kamen einige leichte Geschütze und ein verhältnismäßig umfangreicher Tross. Durch die Operationen von drei Regimentern wurde der Bereich der angerichteten Zerstörungen erweitert, die Beute vergrößerte sich und man errang militärische Erfolge, vor allem durch die Eroberung der Burg Kirempė. Die Operationen von drei getrennten Gruppen verwirrten den Gegner und machten ihm eine wirksame Verteidigung unmöglich. Von Bedeutung war auch die Wahl des Zeitpunkts des Feldzugs (16. Februar – 6. März). Der Spät-

winter umożliwiła die vergleichsweise besten Bedingungen für den Landverkehr, und das herannahende Tauwetter machte es dem Gegner unmöglich eine Gegenoffensive zu beginnen. So kam man sicher nach Wenden zurück, und es wurden keine Moskauer Einheiten in Richtung Dorpat entsandt. Der Winterfeldzug von 1579 nach Livland kann in meinen Augen als das beste Beispiel für die Bewegungskunst der polnisch-litauischen Armeen im 16. Jahrhundert gelten.

Die Marschwege von zwei Regimentern (des linken und des mittleren) verliefen nebeneinander, das dritte (rechte) hatte eine ganz andere Marschroute und drang gleichsam vom Hinterland in russisches Gebiet ein. Das rechte Regiment wurde vom kurländischen Oberst Jürgen Buttler geführt und eroberte die Burg Kirempe. Die Hauptmacht führte Krzysztof Radziwiłł "Piorun", der die Umgebung von Dorpat plünderte. Eine Analyse des von Krzysztof Radziwiłł zurückgelegten *itinerarium* von 1579 zeigt, dass man die verzeichneten Meilen auf etwa acht Kilometer umrechnen muss. Die mittlere Tagesgeschwindigkeit auf dem Zug Wenden–Dorpat–Wenden betrug 21,55 Kilometer, was 2,7 Meilen entsprach. Die Regimenter legten im Verlauf des Feldzugs zwischen 250 und 310 Kilometern zurück, zusammen mit dem Rückweg waren es über 500 Kilometer.

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